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ABSTRACT 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE: THE CEVELOFMQ7T OF A 
CESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY FOR 
UNEERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF THE 
COMPLEX. ORGANIZATION IN CHANGE 
May 1988 
RDCERICK J. BARTELL, B.S., THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.P.A., THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Norma Jean Anderson 
After a general review of the dynamics of personal crisis and 
change, a theory of hew ccnplex organizations decline into a crisis 
state was developed. The premise is that misalignment of dominant 
elements work to establish a degenerative state. Such a state causes 
the organization to become maladaptive. As the maladaptive condition 
increases, change inhibitors begin to form. The level of organiza¬ 
tional decline determines what inhibitor or combination of inhibitors 
evolve. 
The primary organizational change inhibitors identified are: 
inappropriate defense patterns and defense mechanisms; traumatized 
leadership; organizational blockages; and organizational syndromes. As 
misalignment increases, assisted by the negative coping mechanisms or 
inhibitors, a point is reached where a state of disharmonic resonance 
is established (the negative of synergy) and a crisis state is created 
or organization utility equals zero. 
v 
This descriptive theory was then translated into a prescriptive 
model of degenerative intervention called "organizational triage" 
(OIR). Triage refers to an efficient process of identification of the 
most significant dominant elements that will have the greatest impact 
on reversing the decline and the selection of the most appropriate 
intervention protocol—salvage, treatment, or surgery—to realign these 
dominant elements. 
The degenerative intervention model identified seven major stages: 
equilibrium misalignment occurrence, pre-crisis, crisis, stabilization, 
regeneration, and new equilibrium. The pre-crisis and crisis stages 
were further broken into four phases. Intervention and alignment 
strategies and observations about the model were developed. Special 
enphasis was placed on the stabilization of an organization in crisis 
as a triage ocnponent needed to prepare an organization to accept the 
realignment intervention. 
Last, a review of applications, and further areas of research and 
conclusions were presented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INIRDDUCTION 
To place this dissertation effort into perspective, this student 
has to go back to the year 1980. As an external consultant for sane 
eleven years to all types of organizations, several naggirg questions 
started to surface. Such questions included: Why do certain 
consultant interventions seem to work so well when the same 
intervention is rejected by an organization of seemingly similar 
characteristics? Why do managers who move fran cane organization to 
another fail when they were a success in their preceding job? What 
role does an organization's structure play in helping it to cope with 
crisis situations? Why do organizations go out of business at 
different rates? The list was growing rapidly. 
As me progressed frcm research assistant to staff consultant, to 
associate consultant, to managing one's own consulting firm, learning 
about the dynamics of organizational behavior, especially those in 
crisis, became of predominant interest. Tricil and error had been an 
excellent, if expensive, teacher and the student new wanted to more 
formally study the various theories and organizational dynamics to 
determine if indeed an organizational theory did exist that cculd be 
applied with consistent results in an organizational crisis type 
setting. 
It was during the search for an opportunity to formally study 
organizational behavior that the student was introduced to 
organizational development, often labeled O.D. Hus approach to 
1 
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looking at the organizational intervention or change process gave this 
student hope that a process for treating organizations in crisis 
already existed and just needed to be located. Under the guidance of 
his doctoral ccnirdttee, the search began. After an initial, but rather 
rigorous literature review, it was found that little attention had been 
given to understanding ocmplex organizations in crisis, let alone 
identification of the most effective treatment processes. The search 
had now turned into a long-term, tedious process of mining mountains of 
writings and research on organizational theory, organizational 
behavior, organizational development processes, psychology of the 
individual as related to handling personal crisis, and studies of 
organizational decline. The purpose was to glean the nuggets of 
relevant information that would later became the basis from which a 
crisis theory and intervention process would be developed in this 
dissertation. 
This tedious, time consuming process of searching the literature 
and developing a theory about complex organizations in crisis yielded 
an unanticipated benefit. The published writings most recently 
appearing [Ackerman (December, 1986); Brain and Strategy (December, 
1986); Sutton, Eisenhart, and Jucker (Spring, 1986); Meyers (1986); 
Kets de Vries and Miller (1985); and Fink (1986)] are giving 
confirmation to the theory and treatment processes that have been 
developed during the last three years by this student. 
An initial review of the literature about organizational 
development (O.D.) processes, especially in the most closely related 
3 
area of organizational change and transformation technologies, yielded 
an interesting observation. When the O.D. materials and processes 
reviewed were critically analyzed from this student's extensive client 
experience perspective, it was felt that these O.D. interventions and 
processes were being developed for a whole different set of ccnplex 
organizations that were almost foreign to this student's experience. 
Having consulted with well over six hundred different client 
organizations representing a wide portion of the organizational 
spectrum consisting of local and state governments, utilities, 
hospitals, manufacturing and processing plants, research and 
development organizations, high-tech electronic defense contractors, 
service industries, school districts, and training organizations; this 
student found this to be disconcerting. When one attempted to fit the 
O.D. technologies into the client experience base, it was found that 
the O.D. technologies seemed to apply most readily where the 
organizations were operating within the norms or standards for that 
particular industry. However, when the client organization or a 
particular department of the client organization was operating outside 
of the industrial norm—either high growth or decline—the O.D. 
technologies did not seem applicable nor would they have been 
acceptable to the client sponsor of the consultation effort. The 
problem was most pronounced in organizations that were in an admitted 
crisis mode of operation. Typically, exanples of this crisis mode 
existed where the organization was: on the brink of bankruptcy; under 
heavy public, legal, and/or employee assault; in a very volatile market 
4 
or where there were significant changes either in increased or 
decreased demand for services, and/or where the ccnpet it ion for scarce 
resources and market share was intense and not anticipated. 
The result of this ccnparative effort enabled this student to 
formulate three distinct organizational intervention classifications. 
Using these classifications, this student was able to place his 
consultant experience into perspective and relate to the experience of 
others as discussed in the literature. 
It is easiest to understand the three intervention classifications 
when one thinks of them in terms of a spectrum of organizational 
utility. The spectrum is defined as the range of the effectiveness the 
organizational elements can achieve to meet the goals of the 
organization through the interaction and application of its elements. 
The spectrum is divided into three portions. The left side is 
classified as Hi^i-Tech Management (HIM) or requires high-tech 
intervention strategy. The middle portion of the spectrum is the more 
traditional Organizational Develcpmerrt Intervention (O.D.), and the 
right side of the spectrum is classified as Organizational Triage 
Intervention (CTTR). (See Figure 1 on page 5.) 
Hie greater the synergy yielded by the organizational state, the 
further to the left of the spectrum an organization is placed. This 
far left part of the spectrum would be typified as the high growth or 
development portion. An organization that is operating with sane 
effectiveness, but within the normal range for its industry as 
expressed by the operating ratios and other indicators for that 
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industry, is placed in the center of the spectrum. The type of 
organizations that would fit in this portion would be normal growth, 
slew growth, maintenance, and even bureaucratic service organizations. 
Clearly the greatest number of organizations would fit into this 
portion of the spectrum. The third type of organization, on the far 
right portion of the spectrum, is identified as in decline, where the 
organization is not synergistic and where the organization will not 
survive in its current state. When organizations are placed on this 
spectrum, it is most probable that the distribution would resenble a 
typical bell shaped curve (see figure 1). The intervention 
classifications are then matched to these three portions of the 
spectrum. 
★Organizational alignment/utility index 
FIGURE 1 
ORGANIZATIONAL UTILITY SPECIRJM 
Along the spectrum is the "organizational alignment utility 
index." This index, explained more fully in Chapter 3, is an index of 
synergy being produced from a specific organization state. As can be 
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seen in figure 1 on page 5, this index can be expressed as a 
percentage. The percentage range for normal operations is from 0 to 
100%. Organizations which fall within this percentage range can 
benefit from standard organizational development intervention. The HIM 
portion of the spectrum would range from over one hundred percent 
efficiency to some unknown high percentage. The intervals of the HIM 
portion of the spectrum would be minimally stated as an increasing 
geometric progression, and the intervals of the OTR portion would be 
minimally stated as a negative geometric progression. The index drops 
off very rapidly once the organization or organizational unit drops 
below zero. It is this critical drop that often immobilizes the 
management of the organization to act proactively to cxxmter the 
degeneration of the organization or seme segment of the organization; 
the result being a triage type intervention (most often an external 
intervention) is required to stabilize the organization and reverse the 
decline or a severe crisis state will develop. 
When this student compared his experience with a review of the 
O.D. literature, he found he was most often consulting at the extreme 
right side of the spectrum in terms of intervention. Therefore, it 
herein* clear why the traditional theories, management intervention 
models, techniques, and strategies, when applied to this lew extreme, 
would most often yield unreliable and unsatisfactory results. Simply, 
they are not developed to address the lew end of this spectrum. 
Kimberly, Miles, and Associates write: "Very few contaiporary studies 
of organizational development focus on the decline and termination of 
7 
organizations. . . . Moreover, people in general, and especially the 
young scholars in the nascent field of organizational behavior, are 
prone to push the reality of death from their day-to-day 
consciousness.I,J- 
The complexion of today's complex organizations sets up the 
condition to foster crisis. Curtis P. McLaughlin writes: "The result 
of the short time horizon in the public sector can be a pattern of 
'crisis management'. That is the result of attempting to fight fires 
as they arise, especially when the result is attention to detail and 
not to strategy or the development of an effective system."* 2 
However, Kimberly, et al, argue that the literature in public 
administration has at least addressed the decline of organizations and 
referenced several authors that address the issues of organizational 
decline.3 
Ichak Adizes in his treatise "Organizational Passages - Diagnosing 
and Treating Lifecycle Problems of Organizations" developed a lifecycle 
for organizations and explained how to short-circuit premature 
mortality on numerous organizational passages by suggesting various 
"treatments." Through the first seven organizational passages: 
courtship, infancy, go-go, adolescence, prime, maturity, and 
Ijchn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The 
Organizational Life Cycle (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass 
Inc., Publishers, 1981), p. 439. 
2 Curt is P. Mclaughlin, The Management of Non-Profit Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986), pp. 31-32. 
3Kintoerly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle, 
p. 364. 
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aristocracy; he suggested O.D. type interventions. With early 
bureaucracy, he suggested that "prompt surgical treatment is usually 
necessary." He went on to state regarding bureaucracy and death of an 
organization, "I have had no experience with treating these types of 
organizations."4 
Kimberly, Miles, and Associates write; "Starbuck, Greve, and 
Hedberg (1978) propose that a special decision-making taskforce be 
formed to address issues of decline,"5 and recommended "a 'crisis 
corps' that rely primarily on informal power and informal communication 
channels."6 They go on to write this team would; "determine the 
severity of the crisis, present alternative courses of action and, in 
general, prepare the organization to 'weather exit the storm.'"7 
Kimberly, et al, further cite Boulding as writing; "... a cadre 
of consultants who specialize in the management of declining 
organizations would be extremely useful. These people would be called 
into organizations in shock much as Red Adair is called into oil fields 
on fire."8 It is with great interest that this student read this 
remark as he has coined the term of "organizational triage team" and 
4Ichak Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating 
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations", Organizational Dynamics (New 
York; American Management Association, Sumner 1979), p. 22. 
SKiittoerly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle, 
p. 364. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid. 
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has been developing and directing such a team for several years which 
spawned his interest in further developing an organizational crisis 
theory. 
Donald Bibeault cites several authors who suggest organizations 
have a normal growth curve (Greiner, 1972 and Starbuck, 1965) and that 
when deviation becomes too great, correction is impossible and the 
system suffers irremediable damage. The period just before the 
irremediable damage is the crisis period. Donald B. Bibeault writes, 
"Seme companies need emergency treatment until their condition is 
stabilized and more refined evaluations can take place"9. This is a 
classic action definitial of organizational triage. 
Gerald C. Meyers (former chairman of American Motors) writes in 
his recent book: 
"Wartime physicians have developed a crisis management 
system that allocates scarce resources so that they will do 
the most good. It is a brutal, but effective system called 
triage. As the wounded are brought in for treatment, they 
are immediately classified into three groups: 
1) the superficially wounded; 
2) the hopelessly wounded; 
3) the seriously wounded who have a chance for survival. 
It is the last who get most of the attention, because they 
can benefit the most from medical care."10 
9Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turrarcund - Hew Managers Turn 
losers into Winners (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 96 
10Gerald C. Meyers, When It Hits the Fan (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1986), p. 6. 
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He goes on to conclude: "Business has something to learn from 
this stem discipline and from the techniques that have been developed 
to manage illness with modem facilities and techniques."11 
The literature review and more specifically Bibeault's and Meyers' 
statements reaffirm that this student is on the right track with the 
focus of this dissertation. The purpose of this dissertation effort is 
as follows: 
1) Raise the level of interest, and therefore, awareness of the 
phenomenon of organizations' behavior in crisis; 
2) Specifically describe the parameters, factors, and 
interactions of an organization in crisis so a theoretical 
base can be formed on which further research can be launched; 
3) Provide an interim understanding of the dynamics of 
organizations in crisis so that the organizational manager and 
consultant can better tailor existing diagnostic and 
intervention processes to deal with organizations in crisis 
until better processes are developed, tested, and documented; 
4) Identify and meld specific concepts and organizational 
theories into a usable model that can be applied and refined 
by others to form an application base for future development 
of crisis management technology. 
11Ibid. 
CHAPTER 2 
IERSCNAL CRISIS THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORY: A 
BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONAL 
CRISIS THEORY AND INTERVENTION MOCEL 
Personal crisis theory developed by the discipline of psychiatry, 
althcuc^i not a complete or perfect model for understanding ccrplex 
organizations in crisis, does suggest a framework and perspective for 
developing an organizational crisis model. The personal crisis theory, 
as presented here, was used by this student in developing his model. 
This chapter looks at same basic elements of personal crisis theory as 
well as seme organizational change theories that could possibly be 
adapted to the ccrplex organization in crisis. As these crisis 
theories are analyzed and placed into a ccrplex organizational 
perspective, a philosophical basis for the development of a ccrplex 
organizational crisis theory and intervention model evolves. 
Working Definitials 
For purposes of this dissertation the more traditional definition 
of theory, stated as: "a coherent group of general propositions used 
as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena,1,1 will be 
expanded to include models, concepts, theorems, prepositions, and 
hypotheses that attempt to describe, classify, and/or predict 
organizational behavior. 
1The American College Dictionary (New York: Randan House, Inc., 
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1953), p. 1,256. 
11 
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Hie definition of organization, for this dissertation effort, also 
goes beyond the formal definition of: "a body of persons organized for 
seme end or work; the administrative personnel or apparatus of a 
business? or an organism."2 An organization will be defined as . . 
numerous systems . . . functioning together"3 to include such elements 
or subsystems as administration, management, administrative behavior, 
structure, work flows, reward structures, ccraiunication networks, role 
structures, power relationships, feedback systems, and work cultures— 
to name but just a few. 
For purposes of this dissertation, the working definition used for 
personal crisis is taken from Caplan. Caplan defines personal crisis 
as a state: 
"provoked when a person faces an obstacle (hazard) to 
important life goals that is for a time insurmountable 
through the utilization of customary methods of problem¬ 
solving (coping behavior). A period of disorganization 
ensues, a period of upset during which many abortive attempts 
at solution are made."4 
2Ibid., p. 854. 
3con Hellriegel, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Richard W. Woodman, 
cwwd^1-ional Behavior. 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 
Ccupany, 1983), p. 16. 
4Gerald F. Jacobson, ed., New Directions for Mental Health 
cervices (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. , 
citing Gerald Caplan, An Accroach to Catmjnity Mental Health (New or 
Grune & Stratton, 1961). 
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Personal Crisis:—Theory. Concepts, and Elen^m-g 
In his forward, Jacobson states that the basic concepts of 
equilibrium, time, and change are essential to crisis theory.5 Gerald 
Caplan theorizes that there are three key aspects that affect the 
ability of a person to handle emotional strain. These are: 
1) state of ego; 
2) stage of maturity; 
3) quality of its structure.6 
He goes on to explain in more detail that the state of ego is really 
the capacity of the person to withstand stress and anxiety and to 
maintain ego equilibrium. The stage of maturity is determined by the 
degree of reality recognized and faced in solving problems. The 
quality of its structure is determined by the repertoire of effective 
coping mechanisms employable by the person in maintaining the balance 
in the psychobiosocial field.7 
When the customary problem-solving techniques cannot be used to 
meet the normal problems, the balance or equilibrium is upset. The 
individual must either solve the problem or adapt to non-solution. In 
either case, a new state of equilibrium will develop; be it positive or 
negative.8 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
8Ibid., p. 6. 
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Jacobson suggests that crisis theory specifically the 
process of change with an existing equilibrium. Therefore, crisis 
theory is not a comprehensive theory of human functioning and, as a 
result, other bodies of knowledge must be looked at to define the 
nature of equilibrium involved and the changes affecting that balance. 
He suggests that the area of life events studies has attempted to merge 
the area of psychoanalysis and the works of Freud and Erik Erickson 
(1959) and sociology represented by Johnson (1960) into a functioned 
crisis theory. He cites numerous studies—Brown (1974); Holmes and 
Rahe (1967); Myers, Lindenthal, and Pepper (1975); Paykel (1971, 1974, 
1975); and Rahe (1974).9 
As an example of such a life event approach, Holmes and Rahe 
(1967) constructed a "Social Readjustment Rating Scale" composed of 
forty-three events. Each event was weighted (death, divorce, and jail 
term-rated a five on the scale), and the total score was suggested to 
be associated with mental health and the ability to cope.10 
Jacobson's crisis process model makes the assunptions that; 
(1) crisis phenomena follow a specific sequence; (2) equilibrium can be 
HicrHvrKoH by a "life event" (this could include a social, physical, 
physiological, economic, etc., area which is interpreted as a hazard); 
(3) crisis is time-limited; and (4) after new ccping efforts occur, a 
new equilibrium is established. The model generated is shewn in 
9Ibid., p. 4. 
lCVp. R. Holmes and R. H. Rahe, "The Social Readjustment Rating 
Scale," Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 1967, pp. 212 - 218. 
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diagram form in table 1. Coping in this model is defined to include 
both adaptive and maladaptive behaviors. In either case, if sustained 
coping maintains or reestablishes a state of equilibrium. 
TABLE 1 
THE CRISIS SEQUENCE11 
Nonpsychological Area 
Time (Social, Physical, 
Sequence Physiological) 
1 Many Factors 
Life Event occurs 
Interaction 
Ongoing smooth 
interaction 
Life event 
interpreted as 
hazard 
Many Factors Ongoing smooth 
interaction 
Psychological 
Area 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium 
disturbed 
Attempts at 
coping fail 
State of 
crisis ensues 
New coping 
established 
Equilibrium 
The theory also includes the term "chronic crisis" which refers to 
an individual or organizational style of behavior that can induce 
crisis in other individuals or organizational parts craning into contact 
with them. The unique characteristic is that this chaotic mode of 
operation acts as a stabilizing mechanism in the actor, and the actor 
would be thrown into crisis only if this style was interrupted. Time 
HJacobson, New Directions for Mental Health Services, p. 5. 
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is a limiting force in that prolonged personal crisis is not tolerable; 
it is entropic in nature and will cease to exist or die.12 
Of the various developed stress response models and theories 
reviewed, the Horowitz (1976) model seems the most concise and relevant 
for the purposes of this dissertation. This crisis model presents six 
stages of stress response. If the situation is normally responded to 
without blockage, intensification or negative reaction from an 
inoperative adaptive mechanism, the stages progress from: event, 
outcry, denial, intrusion, working through, and couplet ion. A faulty 
stress response can occur at any stage with crisis producing results or 
manifestations. Hie model is shown in figure 2 on page 17.13 
For further clarification between the denial and intrusiveness 
phases, table 2, found on page 18, presents behavior manifestation. 
Needless to say, there could be some direct transference of these 
phases to organizations with seme refinement. 
Seme theories of personal change triggered by crisis events also 
provide some additional insight into hew individuals and ultimately 
organizations can react to and cope with stress. Kubler's (1969) 
acceptance sequence of deeding with death suggested four phases. 
denial—anger—bargaining acceptance.1 
12Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
13m. j. Horowitz and Nancy B. Kaltreider, "Brief Treaty°f 
Post-Tramatic Stress Disorders," New Directions 
Services. ed. Gerald F. Jacobson (San Francisco, California. Jossey 
pacag Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 69. 
14Kubler-Ross, E., on rv^th and Dying (New York: MacMillan, 
1969), pp. 18-41. 
S
tr
es
s 
R
es
po
ns
e 
R
at
es
 
(/> 
</> 
<D 
CO 
CO 
o 
o 
o 
<o 
CL 
Vi 
a» 09 
3 U 4J 
L — 4- 
TJ 4) Q XI 4 
41 c >0) O 4- 
E o 
— 41 *.C 
V U 41 Q. 
(A 
41 V Q. C O C- /-> X 
-C * (/) CO CO •— 4> >* 4 
X O 3 *U *0 TJ ♦«* N 1 L. — «0 <o •- — c c 
41 C -C 
—* O 3 3 4> O 
> <0 X « > W O L 
O a. uj Z < W O U. u. 
/K A /K / 
(A u 4) — 
O 
4-* 4) 
« CQ 4-» 6 </) M O « 
</) 0> 
c o c 
4) .C O N O Q. 
O >* <A 
c w o 
U. o. a 
<0 <0 <A 
4> -- C 
•— 4) L. O 
4-» ac 4) — 
—' L. 
— o 13 a o 
<o 4-» a <A 
c o .c — 
« < U Q 
/K A\ 
T3 
4) 
U O 
CD 
/K 
TJ 
4) 
U 
<0 
a> 
o 
z 
/K 
17 
§ 
E 
H 
I 
TABLE 2 18 
DENIAL AND INTELJSIVENESS FHASES 
Denial Fhast* Intrusiveness Fhase 
Perception and 
Attention 
Daze 
Selective inattention 
Inability to appreciate 
significance of stimuli 
Hypervigilance, startle 
reactions 
Sleep and dream 
disturbance 
Consciousness Amnesia (complete or 
partial) 
Nonexperience 
Intrusive-repetitive 
thoughts and behaviors 
(illusions, pseudo- 
hallucinations, night¬ 
mares, ruminations, and 
repetitions) 
Ideation 
Processing 
Disavowal of meanings Overgeneralization 
of stimuli Inability to concentrate 
loss of reality on other topics, 
appropriacy preocupation 
Constriction of Confusion and disorgan- 
associational width ization 
Inflexibility of 
organization of thought 
Fantasies to counteract 
reality 
Emotional Numbness Emotional attacks or pangs 
Somatic Tension-inhibition type 
synptcms 
Synptcmatic sequel of 
chronic fight or flight 
readiness (of 
exhaustion) 
Actions Frantic overac±ivity to 
withdrawal 
Search for lost persons 
and situations, 
compulsive repetitions 
SOURCE: M. J. Horowitz and Nancy B. Kaltreider, "Brief Treatment 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders," New Directions for Mental Hea 
Services, ed. Gerald F. Jacobson (San Francisco, California: Jossey- 
Bass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 70. 
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Kelly and Conner (1980) also suggested a sequence of emotional 
phases for accepting change. These phases were: ihase I or uninformed 
optimism (certainty); Ihase II or informed pessimism (doubt); Phase hi 
or hopeful realism (hope); Ihase IV or informed optimism (confidence) ; 
and Phase V or rewarding completion (satisfaction) ,15 
Bcwlby suggests the literature discerns four general stages of 
mourning (crisis process) to be: 
"1. Phase of numbing that usually lasts from a few hours to 
a week and may be interrupted by outbursts of extremely 
intense distress and/or anger. 
"2. Ihase of yearning and searching for the lost figure 
lasting seme norths and sometimes for years. 
"3. Phase of disorganization and despair. 
"4. Phase of greater or lesser degree of reorganization."16 
In suntnary, these classifications, breakdowns or phases identified for 
the "working through" of personal crises, mourning, and personal 
change, suggest such a breakdown would be useful for understanding 
complex organizations in crisis. 
Intervention Strategies for Crisis Reduction 
In the middle 1960's, the term crisis intervention was not yet 
included in psychiatric dictionaries. This is significant considering 
that psychiatry is the most advanced discipline to deal with the 
concept of crisis. In 1970, in the fourth edition of Hinsie's 
Psychiatric Dictionary, the term crisis intervention is one of the 
15Don Kelley and Daryl R. Conner, The Emotional Cycle of Change 
(Atlanta, Georgia: O.D. Resources Press, 1980). 
16Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The Neurotic 
Organization (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1985), p. 155 
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several inodes of cxcirunity psychiatry mentioned. It states further 
that "the crisis intervention model . . . demands novel adaptional 
responses."17 
Current pure crisis theory, with regard to personal crisis, 
indicates that the personal crisis will be solved by time alone as the 
human cannot sustain a state of severe crisis. Therefore, personal 
crisis intervention strategies are designed only to help maximize the 
level of functioning after the crisis has ended or for damage control. 
When looking at techniques in crisis intervention, Edwards makes 
the following points: (1) one cannot effectively counsel or provide 
therapy intervention when the client is in a crisis state; (2) when a 
client is off-balance, one must study the client before addressing the 
problem; (3) one cannot give advice in a counseling situation; and 
(4) there are three points of intervention—pre-crisis state, crisis 
state, and post-crisis state. The earlier the intervention, the more 
predictable the results and the less effort required.18 
The author further suggests the "ABC Method" of intervention as 
follows: 
Step A: Counselor acquires information and rapport with client. 
Step B: Counselor boils down the information acxjuired into a 
well-focused sentence of the problem statement. 
17Donna C. Aquilera and Janice M. Messick, Crisis Intervention 
Theory and Methodology. 2nd ed. (St. Iouis: C. V. Moseby Company, 
1974), p. 6. 
18Pcmaine V. Edwards 
(Springfield, Illinois: 
f crisis Intervention and Hew it Works 
Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1977), p. 11 
Step C: Counselor helps the client ape with the problem as 
stated. 
- review alternatives; 
- get client ocmou.tment; 
- have client select choice of coping mechanism that 
makes the most sense to the client and that the client 
can buy into.19 
She suggests that time is a helper as well as a problem generating 
scuroe. Horcwitz also suggests timing as an important ingredient of 
crisis intervention. He illustrates this point with the exairple, shown 
in table 3 on page 22, of the timing of a brief crisis intervention 
(focused in this case on psychotherapy) ,20 As a consultant, this 
student most state that table 3—the timing and activities—are very 
similar to the process he has used with successful organizational 
consultations he has provided to organizations in crisis. 
Ruriloff suggests a number of intervention techniques that could 
be used, although it is recognized that these can be used for non¬ 
crisis type interventions as well. These include: 
- organizational feedback; 
- sensing meetings; 
- "organization mirror"; 
- subsidiary techniques; 
19Ibid., p. 16. 
20Horowitz and Kaltrider, "Brief Treatment of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorders," p. 72. 
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- subgrcuping for problem identification; 
- "fishbowl"; 
- role play; 
- case studies; 
- tape recording feedback (video and audio); 
- active listening; 
- force field analysis.21 
He suggests the latter for diagnosing an existing situation and 
establishing the point where one of the other interventions should be 
used. Briefly, the concept suggests a state of social stability or 
desired equilibrium when the "driving forces" that exert positive 
pressure for change and the "restraining forces" that resist change are 
equal. However, group life is never static since feelings, ecological 
factors, presence, or absence of individuals, etc., constantly change. 
Therefore, the term "quasi-stationary equilibrium" is used in force 
field analysis to determine the "real" equilibrium at any given time. 
See figure 3 on page 24. 
Force field analysis is used to direct where the effort 
(intervention) should be placed to cause the change. The points of 
intervention with this approach are threefold. First, one or more of 
the restraining forces could be lessened; second, one or both of the 
driving forces could be lessened; or third, a combination of one and 
two could be employed. 
21 Arthur A. Kuriloff, Organizational Development for Survival 
(American Management Association, Inc., 1972), pp. 125 - 158. 
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SCXJPCE: Arthur H. Kuriloff, Organizational Development for 
Survival (New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1972), p. 
135. 
FIGURE 3 
FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS 
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Hie author suggests that as a general rule it is more productive 
to reduce restraining forces to "unfreeze" a situation than to increase 
the driving force.22 To increase the driving force can lead to 
increased tension and act to inflame resistance, in crisis 
intervention, increasing the driving force has the opposite desired 
effect of reducing the chaos. This approach of reducing the 
restraining forces allows for a host of possible intervention 
strategies. 
The discipline of psychiatry seems to have cans the farthest in 
developing approaches for dealing with crisis, but the focus is on the 
individual, not the organization. This is understandable for the 
intervention process for the individual in crisis is not as complex an 
intervention process (although it may be as severe and intense or even 
more so) as the organization in crisis. This statement is made for the 
following reasons, based on the experience this student has in 
consulting. 
1). Nature will not take care of the organizational crisis as 
presented by Caplan (earlier in this chapter). He suggests 
that an individual cannot, by his/her own nature, tolerate a 
crisis for long and is therefore time limited. In the organ¬ 
izational setting, the crisis period can be longer. This is 
seen especially in the public sector where the public 
requirement for service continues and the tax base supports 
the organization. Under these circumstances, the organiza- 
22Ibid. 
26 
tion can truly survive longer in that it is not allowed to 
die, and in sane cases, cannot die while a private 
corporation can beams bankrupt and an individual can die. 
2) . Multiple crises can occur in an organization, but be masked 
as one. When an individual has been traumatized by an event 
suds as a death in the family, assault, etc., and goes into a 
crisis state, the crisis intervention specialist can more 
easily identify the triggering event and intervene 
accordingly. The complex organization may be in crisis with 
little understanding of the chain of events that caused the 
crisis. This practitioner has been able to identify as many 
as five different crises operating in the same organization. 
Sane of the crises were more intense because they were the 
result of crises that were inadequately handled (they 
inappropriately adapted to a non-solution) at an earlier 
point in time. 
3) . The organizational groups that must be involved in the crisis 
reduction process (the sponsor, change agent and target) do 
not all experience the same level of crisis, and in sane 
cases, have not yet reached a point of crisis; while others 
cure inoperative due to their severe crisis state. Therefore, 
before intervention can be attempted, the intervener must 
increase the awareness of the crisis situation without 
increasing or spreading the crisis to new areas. 
27 
4) . EMe to the complex nature of organizations, one has to often 
affect five or more ancillary areas in order to reduce the 
crisis in the target area. It is not unlike a heart 
operation where the surgeon must first cut the skin, spread 
the rib cage, place the body on life support systems, etc. 
The same is true of an organization, but with often more 
aggressive (and vocal) resistance by the ancillary areas 
being impacted by the intervention (treatment). 
5) . Knowing the crisis causing event allows for intervention 
specialties to be formed (such as rape crisis centers). 
These specialties enhance the skill of the interveners due to 
• constant exposure (trial and error), increase the level of 
understanding, and ultimately establish a predictable 
treatment process. Needless to say, this extends the 
recognition of the discipline. This recognition, in itself, 
has a calming effect on the individual in crisis knowing that 
the intervener is competent, can empathize with the crisis 
being experienced, and will not become traumatized by working 
with the crisis. Organizational consulting is years away 
from achieving this level of competent expertise and 
recognition. This will remain so until better diagnostic 
tools are available to identify the source of the crisis. 
6). Individuals involved as clients in crisis counseling no 
longer carry the same social stigma that they once did. 
Today stress leaves, bio-feedback, employee assistance 
28 
programs, etc., are becoming accepted and as respected as 
physical exercising, dieting, or other self helps. Many 
corporate organizations operate in a highly competitive 
environment where the term "survival of the fittest" is 
internalized. Even to suggest there is a crisis could open 
up the organization to become the prey of their competitors, 
affect the purchase of stock, erode the confidence of the 
consumer in the product's integrity, etc. in seme cases, 
organizations aggravate the crisis by taking courses of 
action that would indicate they are not having a crisis? 
increasing their physical plant, hiring staff, etc., to prove 
to those watching (internally and externally) that all is 
well. This crisis denied, characteristic of organizations 
affects the treatment process in the following ways: 
a) . The organization does not call the consultant in until 
it is almost or beyond rehabilitation. This situation 
then requires dramatic, high-risk solutions that often 
cause secondary crises due to the short time frame 
available to "ready" the organization for treatment. 
b) . The organization does not recognize the value of the 
consultant service, and therefore, under-budgets the 
corrective process. Often this results in cutting 
comers on the diagnosis so more treatment time can be 
given or materials purchased. 
29 
c) . The sponsor never becomes canaitted or internalizes the 
crisis as his/her problem, but instead calls it "their" 
problem. The sponsor's overt support is required in 
most cases to ensure the treatment "takes" and is not 
rejected by the organization once the consultant leaves. 
d) . A true discipline is difficult to develop because the 
learned lessons are taken from information and 
experience gathered which cannot be shared openly due to 
this climate of ccrpetition and mistrust. 
7). The ccnplexity of working with an organization to intervene 
effectively to reduce crisis is so great that a senior 
consultant cannot work with more than six to fifteen 
organizations a year. Therefore, the learning curve will 
take years longer to develop predictable intervention methods 
because seldom are any two crises caused by the same type of 
event, let alone similarities in the organizational make-up 
and constraints. 
Although brief in description, these described differences are 
real and directly irrpede the successful and easy development of a 
crisis organizational theory and intervention model. 
Organizational change from a Crisis Perspective 
This student's next step was to make the transition from the 
personal crisis literature to an organizational crisis focus. As an 
extension of Jacobsen's basic three concepts essential to personal 
30 
crisis theory-equilibrium, time, and chanje^-a statanent could be 
adapted to say organizations have three variables that are Host 
sensitive to crisis. These are: 
1) propensity to maintain a state of equilibrium; 
2) stage in development; 
3) capacity for structural change (flexibility). 
Table 4, found on page 31, diagrams one useful model of the stages 
of homeostasis development or equilibrium.24 As shown, there are four 
basic phases that an organization or individual must evolve through in 
order for homeostasis to occur. The concept evolves from Bowlby's four 
phases of mourning.25 Once homeostasis occurs—the result of the 
organizational triage intervention process—the stage is set for 
change. In other words, a climate is established which gives an 
organization the ability to adapt to changing conditions. Premature 
exiting or not completing any me of these phases causes the 
homeostasis state to be less than fully realized. 
The steps of the degeneration and ultimate regeneration process 
have been labeled by several theorists, seme most recently. These 
breakdowns are compared in table 5 found on page 32. 
Rets de Vries and Miller broke the process of degeneration- 
regeneration into seven parts: equilibrium; stress event or trigger 
event where homeostasis is disturbed; shock; disbelief or denied; 
23Jacobson, New Directions for Mental Health Services, p. 2. 
24Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 163. 
25Ibid., p. 155. 
TABLE 4 31 
STAGES OF HCMEOSTASIS EEVELOFMENT 
Individual Manager/Employee 
Fhase I: Shock 
Numbing, interrupted by panic, 
outbursts of anger 
[Triggering 
EVent (s) ] 
I 
Fhase II: Disbelief 
Yearning and searching for what 
is lost; disbelief, denial of 
reality; irrational anger; self- 
reproach, sadness; insannia or 
extensive sleeping 
1 
Fhase III: Discarding 
Despair; disorganization; 
discarding or old patterns of 
feeling, and acting; 
redefinition of oneself 
Fhase IV: Realization 
Reshaping of internal represent¬ 
ational world; acceptance of new 
reality and values, beliefs and 
thoughts 
Organization 
I 
State of disarray; organizational 
process canes to a halt or becomes 
ritualistic, a feeling event can 
still be undone 
Fight/flight; search for omnipotent 
leader; dependency need manifests as 
passivity; internal politics 
increase—use of protective 
behavior; source of blame sought; 
longing for return to status quo 
("good ole days"); search for what 
is lost 
i 
Achieved Condition: 
I 
Rethinking or extinguishing of old 
old goals and objectives; thinking, 
motivational needs restated in less 
complexity; acceptance of organiza¬ 
tional situation; occasional flight 
behavior; redefinition of situation; 
tentative explorations; pre-testing 
Reorganization: proactive posture; 
future orientation; explanation of 
process and justification developed 
(after-the-fact) 
Homeostasis 
SOURCE: Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The 
ftoimtic organization: Diagnosing and Changing Counterproductive 
Styles of Management (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., 
Fhblishers, 1985), p. 163. 
NOTE: These stages are the same for developing homeostasis after 
a change has been initiated or to compensate for stress causing, 
triggering event, or stimuli that dictates a change is required. 
Whether an OD or CTO process is used depends on the intensity, 
tenacity, and persistence of the situation. 
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33 
discarding; realization; and new homeostasis achieved. This model was 
adapted from Bowlby's "phases of mourning" and incorporates the factor 
of a trigger event or significant disturbing of the homeostasis.26 
This student has observed this phenomenon in several consultations. 
The trigger acts to coalesce management temporarily which allows a 
threshold to be met that calls collective attention to the problem. 
All of a sudden a majority realizes the organization is out of control 
and shocik follows. This part of the model is especially useful to the 
development of this theory; in particular, how to initiate the 
turnaround phase; and is discussed later. 
Jacobson, in his "crisis process model,"27 has a six stage model. 
These stages are: equilibrium; equilibrium disturbed; attempts of 
coping fail; state of crisis ensues; new coping established; and 
equilibrium. This is very descriptive of the deterioration process. 
Ackerman, in her "transformation change model" suggests six steps. 
These are: birth; growth; plateau; chaos; death; and re-emergence.28 
She uses a chart to describe this process which is not unlike what this 
student developed a few years earlier. Her re-emergence is the "new 
equilibrium" and "new homeostasis achieved," as discussed in the other 
models above. However, her term suggests possibly a new organization 
26Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 159 - 
163. 
27Gerald F. Jacobson, ed., New Directions for Mental Health 
Services, p. 5. 
28Linda S. Ackerman, "Development, Transition or Transformation: 
The Question of Change in Organizations," OP Practitioner, December 
1986, pp. 1-8. 
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is evolved which this student questions if it is really the recycling 
back to "birth." If this is the case, it is not a phase of 
transformation, but the beginning of a new organizational entity. 
Meyers, in his "unmanaged crisis sequence," is helpful in that he 
breaks the crisis sequence into three stages: pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis. He suggests a sequence of three sub-stages or observable 
manifestations exists for each of these three stages. The pre-crisis 
stage has the sequence of non-performance which results in denial or 
recrimination and lastly evolves into anger or fear. The crisis stage 
starts with failure, moves to panic, and results in collapse. The 
post-crisis stage begins with shock which creates uncertainty and 
evolves into radical change.29 
This model is helpful in that the stage sequences are observable 
dimensions. It also verified the three stages that this student had 
identified several years earlier with his work with organizations in 
crisis. It was a welcome support and verification for this independent 
work effort. However, this model, as well as the others, does not go 
far enough in explaining the dynamics of how the deterioration occurs 
and is reversed. 
Bibeault, in his "stages of turnaround" was most helpful in this 
regard. He proposes that there are seven stages of turnaround. These 
stages are: the decline stage, the unprofitable stage, the change of 
management stage, the evolution stage, the emergency stage, the 
29Gerald C. Meyers, When it Hits the Fan: Managing the Nine 
Crises of Business (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 24 - 
25. 
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stabilization stage, and lastly, the return-to-nonnal growth stage.30 
Although this model was developed independently of this student's work, 
it is the closest description of what this student has experienced in 
his work with rehabilitating organizations in crisis. For of 
understanding, this student took Bibeault's descriptions of the stages 
of turnaround and placed them in matrix form. This is found in table 6 
(see page 36). As constructed, one can easily carpare both 
horizontally and vertically the various stages and their differences. 
Bibeault was one of the few authors to discuss in any detail the 
emergency stage approach of stopping the bleeding, initiating 
turnaround leverage, and performing surgery as necessary. Bibeault, in 
his stages of turnaround model (see table 6), discussed the stages from 
four perspectives: corporate turnaround cycle, people motivation 
cycle, focus of effort, and approach. Each had seven different parts 
to correspond with the seven stages.31 
In the first stage or decline stage, the people motivation is 
labeled "deterioration" with the focus of effort still being "business 
as usual." The approach taken at this stage is just "passive 
maintenance." 
The second stage being the "unprofitable stage," causes 
"demoralization" of the members with the focus of the effort new 
30Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround - Hew Managers Turn 
Losers Into Winners (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 96. 
31Ibid, pp. 91 - 109; 158 - 162; 182 - 199; 251 - 262. 
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"oonoem." Hie approach occurring at this point is increased 
awareness. 
The third stage is the "change^f-management stage" where the 
people motivation cycle becomes one of a "honeymoon" with the new 
management where individuals are hopeful that the solution has been 
found. The focus of the effort is on "assessment of the situation" and 
"new leader selection." The approach taken at this point in the 
turnaround is labeled the "moment of truth" where management must 
recognize that to go on further with the current leadership will not 
resolve the declining situation. Also at this stage the approach 
includes "new leader identification" and "star selection" or the 
selection of the person to lead the turnaround. 
The fourth stage is the "evolution stage" where the ''honeymoon" 
cycle continues in terms of how the stage inpacts the organizational 
members. The focus of the effort now becomes a "search for a viable 
company core" (of product or service) and a search for a "turnaround 
leverage point" or "points" as may be available. The approach used is 
threefold: "problem identification," "solution action plan design," 
and "plan cx*rmunicaticns to those with power to implement." 
The fifth stage is the emergency stage where the organizational 
members are neutral as to the possible outcome of the turnaround. The 
focus of effort is on "retrenchment," "correction," "movement," and not 
cm motivation. The approach used typically includes: "stepping the 
bleeding" or where the corporate dollars are being wasted; initiating 
the turnaround leverage? and conducting "surgery" as necessary or the 
removal of organizational members or work units that are impeding the 
success of the organization. 
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Ihe sixth stage is the "stabilization stage" where people now 
become cctimitted to the new organizational turnaround state. The focus 
of the effort is new on "controlled profit growth" and "consistency." 
The approach is "looking beyond today" to "protect the motherlode" or 
the primary profit center and to "reposture the company" as now on the 
way to recovery. 
The last stage of corporate turnaround is the "return-to-growth" 
stage. The people motivation cycle is "enthusiasm," with the focus of 
effort now being "development and growth revenue." The approach 
applied here is "strategic planning." 
Kurt Lewin's (1958) simple model of change (see figure 4) is also 
in concert with the theories mentioned previously. 
unfreezing refreezing 
Present (creating the Transition (stabilizing Desired 
State motivation to State integrating State 
(solid) change) (liquid) changes) (solid) 
- Equilibrium - - Disequilibrium - - Equilibrium - 
FIGURE 4 
LEWIN'S CHANGE MDDEL?2 
32K. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," Social Psychology, 
E. E. Maoooby, T. N. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds. (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 23 - 27. 
As just discussed, the material of these theorists is useful as a 
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point of reference and perspective when developing a ocnplex 
CHAPTER 3 
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONAL » 3«3> DERATION: THE THEORY 
This student's work with hundreds of complex organizations at 
various stages of degeneration has allowed this student to select, 
study, test, accept, or reject a wide number of operational 
organizational theories and concepts from a field application 
perspective. The result of this effort concluded that no one theory, 
when reviewed and applied in real case settings, was consistently 
predictive and descriptive of the complex organizational degeneration 
process. The task was then to develop such a theory of crisis. The 
theory is developed as follows. 
Concept of Alignment: The Theory's Cornerstone 
Simply, complex organizations are made up of dominant and 
recessive elements that interact in various ways with one another. 
Traditional organizational theories are an attempt to describe these 
various interactions, often called organization behaviors or 
organizational dynamics. As these elements align with one another for 
a given purpose, one has the basic configuration or definition of an 
organization. The greater the number of elements interacting the more 
complex is the resulting "organization." Therefore, the cornerstone of 
the theory of organizational crisis starts with the term "alignment." 
In Rowe and Mason's recent book, Managing with Style, they write. 
"How each individual confronts the external world and 
responds to the four forces [personal needs, environmental 
pressures, task requirements, and group demands] is 
determined by his or her cognitive complexity and 
40 
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environmental propensity. We consider an individual in 
'alignment,' or in a state of equilibrium, when cognitive 
complexity and environmental propensity are appropriately 
related to the demands imposed by the four primary forces."1 
Ihe tern "alignment," as used in this dissertation, exists when 
the interaction of two or more organizational elements produces a state 
of equilibrium. When the elements sue maximally aligned they will be 
"synergistic" or the output of the elements is greater collectively 
than the sum of the outputs of the elements taken individually. 
Therefore, two plus two is more than four in a synergistic situation. 
The opposite effect can also be predicted in that the lack of 
alignment can create a state of organization disequilibrium and 
uncertainty where the organization cannot cope or effectively use 
customary methods to bring the organization back into equilibrium. The 
result being the organization spirals downward into an ever-increasing 
crisis state as attempts at solution fail. 
Degree of Alignment Expressed as the Utility Index 
The utility of a complex organization is then directly related to 
the level of alignment present between its elements. This utility can 
be expressed as an organizational alignment or utility index. A formal 
definition would be a qualitative description which may be a number 
used for descriptive/ comparison purposes, that implies the amount of 
utility a particular level of organizational alignment can provide to 
meet the mission/goals (s)/objective(s) of the organization. In other 
iAlan J. Rowe and Richard 0. Mason, Managing with Style: A Guide 
to understanding. Assessing, and Improving Decision Makjjjg (San 
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1987), P- 6 • 
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words, as the alignment of the organizational elements increases, the 
organization becomes more actualized (increased utility) as a delivery 
system to aocotplish a predetermined mission/goal/cbjective. The 
greater the utility index score, the greater the probability that the 
purpose will be accorplished through the particular organizational 
alignment configuration. 
As the utility index increases, the efficiency or ratio of the 
effective or useful output to the total input in the organization2 also 
increases. This utility index can be placed in chart form as seen in 
figure 5 on page 43. As shown, the utility index is placed into a 
spectrum with four operating bands. Point "B" on the spectrum is the 
point where the useful output to the total input cost is equal. As one 
moves toward point "C," the useful output to the total input decreases 
to a point where there is significantly greater cost being expended to 
achieve the output. This part of the spectrum covers both high and low 
bands. The decrease in these two bands is suggested to be linear by 
this student. If one would distribute the modem day organizations 
along this four band spectrum, one would find generally a normal 
distribution, as presented in figure 1 found on page 5. 
When one moves toward either end of the spectrum, "A" or "D," a 
significant difference is noted. An organization that has a high 
utility index will be synergistic and the output of the elements will 
be greater than the total input into the organization. The greater the 
2Paraphrased from: The American Heritage Dictionary (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), p. 440. 
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alignment, the greater the synergy and a resulting greater utility 
index score. This part of the spectrum has been labeled the ultra-high 
band. 
A score less than zero or below point »C" has a low utility index 
and will be moving towards a state of randanness or destructive 
degeneration. In this part of the spectrum, ultra low band, the 
alignment of the elements actually absorbs and expends resources at a 
greater rate than the total input provides. Any productivity actually 
"costs" the organization and acts to deplete reserves at an ever 
increasing rate as one digresses along the spectrum towards point "D." 
Point "D" is where maximum entropy or chaos, the negative of 
organization, is fully formed. 
Extensive experience of this student indicates that as the 
organization moves beyond point "B" towards point "A," the synergistic 
state seems to escalate at a much greater rate than the linear rate and 
it is suggested that this rate of change towards mavimim synergy is 
geometric. The movement, or organizational degeneration, from point 
"C" to point "D" also increases at a much more rapid rate, based on 
degenerative measurements3 taken by this student of organizations 
identified as operating at this end of the spectrum, it is suggested 
again that this ultra low band degeneration rate is geometric. As 
•^The Survey of Management Practices, by Clark L. Wilson (Boulder, 
Colorado: Booth Wright Management Systems, Inc., 1981), and the 
Organizational Diagnostic questionnaire. by Robert C. Preziosi [The 
1980 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, edited by J. William 
Pfeiffer and John E. Jones (San Diego: University Associates, Inc., 
1980) ], both yielded the same results when applied by this student. 
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organizations move toward the entropic end of the spectrum, 
misalignment increases, degeneration of the organization occurs, and a 
state of crisis forms. 
It is important to note that "profit," by the model, is not a 
predictor of organizational health. An utility index of zero does not 
correlate consistently with zero profit. A newly formed company at the 
early stages of its development may be very healthy and in the ultra 
high part of the spectrum and not yet show a profit in its financial 
statement. In contrast, this student has found, along with others,4 
that organizations in their declining cycle of development (clearly in 
the low band of the spectrum) may show a profit. 
Also shown in figure 5, found on page 43, is a general comparison 
of utility index spectrum by: the critical organizational dynamics 
that operate; the predominant organizational states; the classical 
organizational manifestations that occur as one moves along the 
spectrum; and the organizational intervention approach that would be 
nost applicable to guide change along the organizational utility 
spectrum. These four areas are placed in relationship to each other 
and along the spectrum for ease of comparison and for greater 
understanding of the utility spectrum. 
The ultra high band or synergistic organizational formation is in 
the optimizing or "soaring" organizational state. Seme typical 
organizational manifestations would be a high team spirit, a matrix 
4Ichak Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating 
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," Organizational Dynamics (New 
York: American Management Association, Summer 1979), p. 6. 
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management type of organizational structure and organizational growth 
over one standard deviation above the norm for that particular 
industry. The organizational intervention approach would be ''high-tech 
management" (HIM). 
The high band part of the utility spectrum or the "rational 
organizational formation" is the development, and oftentimes, the 
beginning or ending of the degenerating organizational state. At its 
best, the organization in this part of the spectrum has such 
manifestations as balance and cooperation, and at the lower end of the 
high band the formation of mistrust, conflict, and the beginning of 
ccrmmication breakdown or blockage. The organizational intervention 
approach used in both the high and low band portion of the spectrum is 
what is cdimonly referred to as Organization Development or O.D. 
Disharmonic resonance begins to occur during the low band part of 
the spectrum. Typically characteristics of pre-crisis exist such as 
organizational sickness and potentially the formation of organizational 
syndromes. The ultra lew end of the spectrum is depicted by the 
destructive degeneration organizational formation brought on by well 
established disharmonic resonance. The organizational state starts as 
crisis and, if not turned around, ends in termination for the 
organization. Termination can be in any form from bankruptcy, to an 
artificially kept alive private or public organization, to a 
restructuring so drastic that the original organization could not be 
classified as being the same organization. 
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The organization manifestations often observed are paralysis arri 
panic to collapse. The intervention approach to be nest effectively 
applied would be Organizational Triage or OIR. Organizational Triage 
is basically a cccplex, three part intervention strategy. Part one is 
the quick assessment, pinpointing, and prioritization of the areas of 
misalignment where realignment would provide the greatest change with 
the least time and resources expended (find the bleeders). Part two is 
the stabilization phase of the organization which is necessary to 
affect the desired realignment process (stop the bleeding). Part three 
is the application of leverage turnaround points to initiate the 
realignment of the dominant elements that ultimately provide an 
opportunity to reintroduce effective management back into the 
organization (apply the treatment). 
ni sharmnnic Resonance: A Critical Factor in the 
Dynamics of Organizational regeneration 
and Crisis Formation 
Disharmonic resonance, as used in this theory, is when two or more 
elements are in such conflict or dissonance that they set-up an 
organization condition that requires the organization to divert 
resources from its primary mission to a secondary mission which is to 
attempt to resolve the area of conflict. However, the level of 
conflict is so well-established, traditional methods of coping are 
ineffective, thus requiring more and more of the organization's 
resources and efforts to be diverted. In other words, disharmonic 
resonance is the negative form of organizational synergy. 
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A sinple illustration would be when two baseball players fran 
opposing teams exchange words. As the exchanje becomes heated to where 
physical confrontation occurs (the state of disharmonio resonance has 
been achieved), the "benches enpty." The game players row focus on 
breaking up the fight and protecting their own players. The game 
officials remove the players that started the fitfit. The resulting 
organizational state of the team is less than before the fight, or in 
other words, it has degenerated. 
Figure 6, entitled "Organizational Utility Spectrum: Summary of 
Dynamics of Degeneration" (see page 49), highlights the key points of 
degeneration along the spectrum for further clarification. As can be 
seen, an organization in the high band "G" area meets the conditions 
necessary to form a state where misalignment of dominant elements can 
start to occur. As these elements increase in their misalignment, the 
next condition is created to set up a disharmonic resonance shown as 
"H." At point "I" disharmonic resonance is formally operating, the 
threshold is met where the intolerable level of disorganization occurs, 
and performance is most often starting to be severely impacted. Point 
"J" is where the organization has declined to a point where negative 
coping mechanisms will be applied proactively in the form of syndromes, 
panic, paralysis, and an overall state of crisis exists. Lastly, point 
"K" is the formation of a state where an organization becomes a 
candidate for termination. 
More specifically, the degeneration cycle is diagrammed in figure 
7, labeled "Organizational Degeneration Cycle Example: A Schematic 
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Diagram" (see page 51). The diagram depicts the evolution of the 
degeneration process of an organization through the increasing 
misalignment of two or more elements, in this particular example, the 
dominant operational element is motivation feedback with the recipient 
of the feedback being the task group and the provider of the feedback 
being management. 
In this illustration, the perception of the type, level, and 
consistency of the motivation feedback being provided starts out being 
in sync. The amount, consistency, form, and other aspects of the 
motivation feedback is adequate for the perceived needs of the sender 
and receiver. This in-sync phenomenon is called equilibrium (as 
initially developed by Walter Cannon and described best for our 
purposes by Kurt Lewin in his treatise "Group Decision and Social 
Change")5 as a state of equilibrium has been reached. This is 
expressed in the diagram as a sine wave. 
Rcwe and Mason use a metaphor to illustrate this notion of 
alignment. 
"When two electrical waves 'coincide' in frequency, the 
amplitude of the incoming signal will be increased and thus 
'anplify' the energy available. Similarly, 'alignment' leads 
to increased satisfaction and positive reinforcement, which 
in turn contributes to improved performance through greater 
psychic energy. The opposite effect can also be predicted: 
Lack of alignment tends to lead to negative reinforcement and 
5r. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," Social Psychology, 
eds. E. Maccoby, T. N. Newcanb, and E. L. Hartley (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). 
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decreased performance. This 'negalignment' inhibits 
ocnmitment to the organization or willingness to ccnprtmise 
on decisions and ultimately can lead to frustration^ 
avoidance, and withdrawal.  
When an internal pressure, as shown in figure 7 on page 51, or an 
external (environmental) "driving force" is placed on one or more of 
the elements of the organization, the elements succunb and shift to 
acccmnodate this influence. This shift will not always be the same for 
each element operating in the organization. Initially each element 
will respond with seme form of resistance—being reactive, passive or 
proactive6 7. This resistance will vary depending on: the type of 
element (dominant or recessive); the element's flexibility (design, 
cultural base, and/or role in the organization) ? the intensity and 
duration of the pressure? the organizational blockages that exist; the 
number of other elements that will be displaced by the element's 
adjusting shift to the influence (pressure) ? and the intensity of the 
bonding between supportive elements. The effect of the adjustment due 
to the pressure can cause further alignment or misalignment. In Figure 
7, misalignment was initiated. (Shown as point "A" on figure 7.) 
As the misalignment period is extended and increased (shown in the 
distance between point "A" and point "B" on figure 7), organizational 
dissonance is established (point "B" on figure 7). Typically this can 
be measured as a thirty point spread between respondent groups in the 
6Rowe and Mason, Managing with Style: A Guide to Understanding, 
Assessing, and Improving Decision Making, p. 62 - 63. 
7Roderick J. Bartell, "Section 117 Assessment," conducted for HRB- 
Singer, Inc., State College, P.A., 18 May 1987, p. 9. 
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Survey of Pr^inm organizational diag**tic !**»»*. 
This student's experience has been that when dissc^x* has been fully 
developed, other elements within the task cycle ^asurtd by the Survey 
glManaqement PnrtW will be loving in the same direction of 
misalignment. Hie exception to this rule is the »i-fps»9 or ^ 
pressure element and the "T-TOS-IO or tensicn level element that will 
shew up as reactive coping or counter reaction (shown as a positive 
score) on this diagnostic instrument. 
As the misalignment continues, without corrective intervention, 
significant organizational dissonance will be able to be observed and 
measured (shown as point "C" on figure 7 found on page 51). ihe 
organization will have digressed to the low range of the organizational 
utility spectrum by this time. Conflict, mistrust, and the start of 
caimunication breakdown manifestations, such as rumors largely 
replacing timely legitimate communication, will be able to be observed. 
11110 Sutvey of Management Practices8 9 10 11 instrument or example element will 
measure close to two standard deviations below the norm mean for the 
organization. 
8Clark L. Wilson, Survey of Management Practices (Boulder, 
Colorado: Booth Wright Management Systems, Inc., 1984). 
9As defined by the Survey of Management Practices instrument, high 
levels of goal pressure, unless accompanied by strong interpersonal 
scores, can imply abrasive pressure. Very low scores can denote lack 
of push for goal achievement. 
10As defined by the Survey of Management of Practices instrument, 
the degree of stress in the relations between management and the group 
members, feelings of uneasiness in the relationship, etc. 
lljWilson, Survey of Management Practices. 
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Hie student suggests verifying these measurements with at least 
one other instrument, such as the Organizationi 
Questionnaire. 12 measuranent of misalignment is presented by a 
score of 3.5 or higher for the misaligned element with this instrument. 
In cur example, two areas would shew a score of at least 3.5_ 
"leadership” and "rewards." The "structure" element would most 
probably also shew a movement towards misalignment, but not to the same 
level (less than 3.5) on this instrument. 
As can be noted on figure 7, found on page 51, the sine waves 
between point "B" and "C" are becoming increasingly larger and more out 
of sync with each other. At point "C" the organizational elements are 
new in contra-position for the first time. The intensity is such that 
the task group perception of the state of the dominant operational 
element, "motivation feedback," is new outside of "accepted limits." 
This causes a perturbation of such a level of significance to the 
organization that it moves the organization towards an entrcpic 
organizational state. This is shewn as point "D" chi figure 7. The 
organization compensates for this perturbation shown as the trough 
following point "D." This counter reaction is not adequate (point "F") 
to form a movement towards a new alignment and in our example the 
dissonance is increased once again to a new intensity shewn as point 
12Rcbert C. Preziosi, "Organizational Diagnosis Questionnaire 
(ODQ)," The 1980 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, eds. J. 
William Pfeiffer and John E. Jones (San Diego: University Associates, 
Inc., 1980), pp. 112 - 120. 
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"G." It should be noted that in a turnaround cycle, 
would be of lower intensity to that of point "c." 
ciiagram point "G" 
Typically, the pivotal point, shown as point »F,« to avoid further 
decline is the ability of management to grasp the severity of the 
problem or the misalignment, and management's ability to respond 
adequately. In a degenerative mode, as shown, the management starts to 
"freeze up" by denying the severity of the problem, by projecting a 
source of blame to another group or situation they do not control, or 
by refusing to oamunicate about the problem, if a solution is 
selected, it most often is not radical enough to trigger a turnaround. 
For exanple, management may try to implement stronger internal controls 
when an extensive management style change is really required. At this 
point of decline, this student often has observed management reart by 
increasing internal controls and the use of written corrunications 
where in the pash verbal ccinmnicaticns were adequate. 
At point "G," shown on figure 7, found on page 51, the condition 
is acute and is beccming chronic as the misalignment continues. The 
troughs, shewn as point "E", are moving each time of occurrence further 
tewards the cuter limits of "acceptable behavior1' of the organizational 
norm. When the peak of the wave and the trough of each sequential wave 
move further with increasing intensity from the "acceptable behavior" 
norm for the organization and the dissonance of this element is contra¬ 
position or alignment, a state of disharmonic resonance is established 
(shewn as point "H"). This phenomenon, organizationally speaking, is 
the opposite of synergy. At this point the organizational utility 
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index is at zero and continues to decline at a geometric rate of 
degeneration. The wave length increases and distance between peaks 
decreases. This shift from a linear degeneration to a geometric 
degeneration requires quicker managerial assessment and more radical 
response or adjustment. From this student's experience, it is these 
two managerial skills, assessment and response, that are most often 
lacking and help to foster the misalignment condition initially. 
At this point in the degeneration process (point "H"), the 
organization enters the ultra low band and the organization is now 
formally in crisis. Management paralysis, panic, or other negative 
coping behaviors take up the valuable time needed to resolve the 
situation. Organizational syndromes may occur, which often are the 
result of one or more internal organization task groups' attenpts at 
coping with (counter-reaction) the leadership vacuum that the 
managerial crisis state has created. The task group creates informal, 
surrogate leadership that is not recognized, authorized, or in any way 
connected to the formal, legitimate power structure of the 
organization. A diagnostic snapshot taken of one of those task groups 
at this syndrome development state when this surrogate leadership is in 
its early formulation stages would show the diagnostic results register 
a much better state (low band profile) than what should really be 
depicted. This false reading occurs because the task group is reacting 
to the spurious organizational leadership the surrogate creates. 
During this brief period, production will actually increase, 
morale will increase, and attrition will stabilize. However, in a 
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short period, the surrogate leadership (often those individuals that 
are tost technically proficient or expert and/or tie nest senior) 
cannot cepe with the pressure of their dual roles. They nest perform 
in both the expert role required by the fonnal organization am in the 
informal leadership role assigned by the task group. These 
individuals, or the "first string" leadership of the task group, then 
leave their task group. This may be in the form of early retirement, 
the requesting and acceptance of a special project assignment outside 
of the task group, or leaving the organization for another pcsiticn or 
for "personal reasons." 
As the spurious leadership team or "first string" members start to 
leave the task group due to this dual role pressure, increased 
leadership is demanded of the remaining leadership team. The attrition 
rate of this "first string" leadership escalates and is replaced by the 
"second string1' leadership team. By the nature of being "second 
string," the leaders that replace those that left have less ability to 
resist and cope with the dual role pressure. The result is the task 
group leader replacements leave in even shorter time. The "third 
string" leadership, if such a depth of leadership exists, quickly exits 
and a new leadership vacuum occurs. Morale drops, focus is on survival 
not production, and resource reserves are quickly depleted. This state 
of degeneration is noted by others outside the task group and the task 
group now cannot be trusted to predictably provide value to the 
organization. The stage is set for termination. 
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Dgninantai^ Reoftf^s ive Elgpentai_Their Defini h™ 
ar]d Pole jji OyganizaUon Degeneration 
and Crisis Formal- i rr 
Although mentioned already, the organizational element is what 
becomes out of alignment and causes the crisis state. An important 
factor in understanding organizations in crisis is to understand and 
identify the elements that are out of alignment. The key to this 
occurrence is the term "dominant element." Organizational elements can 
be either dominant or recessive, as proposed by this student. 
An element could be: an individual person such as a manager with 
a particular managerial style; a task group that has a defined power 
base, such as a collective bargaining group or union; a process such as 
task feedback; a specific operating system such as a management 
information system or inventory control system; an organizational 
condition or state such as a particular mission, structure, culture, 
task cycle, state of development, or cycle of development; a group of 
relational interface bonding factors: influence vector/valence, value, 
communication pattern, or trust; or an external or internal 
environmental condition, such as: type of technology, rate of 
exchange, condition of physical plant, economy, capacity, and 
ocnpetiticn. 
An element becomes dominant when it meets one or more of the 
following four conditions. One, an assessment of the organizational 
condition or managerial profile concludes a specific element or 
elements are significantly impacting the efficiency or effectiveness of 
other operating elements. This impacting process can take the form of 
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neutralization, triggering, or inhibiting the contribution other 
elements provide. For eaanple, if a manager has a eaasured nental 
agility score (reported on the Aj. scale of Ihe Profit b^tament)!! 
of 8 or in the 95th percentile for middle managers and a managerial 
naivety (lack of ability to probe into issues) score of 2 or low for 
managers (Dg scale of The Profiles instrument) the dominant mental 
agility element will act to minimize the negative effect of the 
managerial naivety (over assuming nature) skill dimension (element). 
Another example is when an organizational stressor of lack of task 
feedback [measured by the Organizational Role Stress "resource 
inadequacy" (RIn) dimension] measures in the caution range or 
inadequate (10 to 15 points), due to insufficient information flow, it 
will typically trigger role ambiguity stress [measured on the 
Organizational Role Stress Scale instrument "role ambiguity" (RA) 
dimension]. If significantly severe (over 15 points), or if "role 
ambiguity" exists over the long-term, the formal organizational 
structure becomes in question, and organizational breakdown will 
result. 
TVro, an element becomes dominant when it varies substantially from 
the norm. Typically an element becomes dominant when it is cx>e or more 
standard deviations from the element's norm for the given organization 
13James E. Moore, The Profile (Fort Worth, Texas: Profiles 
International, Inc., 1977). 
14Udai Pareek, "Organizational Role Stress Scale," The 1983 Annual 
for Facilitators. Trainers, and Consultants, eds. Leonard D. Goodstein 
and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego, California: University Associates, 
Inc., 1983), pp. 115 - 123. 
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or industry. Par sample, if the role stress mean for all stressors 
for an individual manager (measured on the Owanizatim,! a,- 
Ssls) is 96.5 or in the low range and a particular dimension such as 
"role overload" [measured by the Organizational tele strre, 
instrument "role overload" (RO) dimension] is 18 or in the severe 
range, this "role overload" dimension becomes a dominant element. 
Ihree, an element also becomes dominant when it acts independently 
to "drive" or to influence a major shift in the interactions between 
other elements. For exanple, market for a product has been shown to be 
a strong organizational variable and would, therefore, by definitial, 
be a dominant element. Four, an element that requires an unusual 
amount of attention or resources to maintain would also be dominant. 
An exanple of this is when an employee has personal problems that 
affect his work and require special counseling and management 
attention. 
As an organization develops, the dominance or recessiveness of an 
element may change or even switch. The author has not found any type 
of intervention approach to be successful in arbitrarily changing the 
dominance or recessiveness of a given element short of changing the 
whole complexion of the organization which Miles, in his book The 
Organizational Life Cycle.15 argues may not in reality be the same 
organization. 
15Jchn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The 
Organizational T.ife Cycle (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass 
Inc., Publishers, 1981). 
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It should be noted that the presence of dominant elaents does not 
surest misalignment exists or will develop. However, this student has 
noted that the existence of a large meter of dcmnmnt eluents creates 
a very ocmplex organizational state that mates intervention or reversal 
of organizational decline mdi more difficult to accomplish and 
requires a mxh longer -healing- time for the organization to reach a 
new state of equilibrium. 
In studying hundreds of organizations, this student has been able 
to identify a number of such elements that are candidates for 
misalignment. There are twelve primary organizational element areas. 
As the reader will note, not all elements are exclusive to a primary 
organizational element area, but they do overlap in that often one or 
more will be operating sunUtanecusly in two or more primary 
organizational element areas. They are: 
1) . Organizational Rirpose 
2) . Organizational Configuration 
3) . Motivation 
4) . leadership Relations 
5) . Task Readiness/Ability 
6) . Supporting Systems and Structures 
7) . Task Group Relations 
8) . Technical Environment (internal) 
9) . Economic Environment (external) 
10). Fhysical Environment 
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11) . Organizational Flexibility 
12) . Manager/Organization Profile Interface 
These primary element areas mist be in alignment with one another as 
well as the elements within each of the primary element areas. These 
internal element alignments are discussed in more detail as follows. 
Element Area: Organizational Ptrrpreo 
The first element area—organizational purpose—typically is seen 
operationally as the elements of vision statements, mission statements, 
goals (both personal and organizational wide), objectives, and task 
purpose or clarity. In other words, why was the organization formed 
and what business are we in? As the organization becomes more mature, 
the personal goals and objectives must be realigned with the 
organizational goals as less variance can be tolerated. This is 
diagrammed in figure 8, found on page 63. 
Also seen on this diagram is an example, shown as "B" and "C," of 
a typical misalignment. The individual is advancing or maturing 
organizationally at a faster rate than is his/her organization as an 
entity. This student has been able to identify six stages of 
maturation through which organizations evolve. The stages are: Stage 
I—autocratic (often founder operated) ? Stage II—benevolent (typically 
a "family*' orientation) ? Stage III—formal pyramidal (traditional boss 
and employee role orientation); Stage IV—participative (structured 
task teams with team leaders); Stage V—emergent (shared leadership 
which often includes employee ownership, matrix management, or 
"professional team" orientation); and Stage VI—holistic (where one's 
Stage of 
Organizational 
—Maturation 
Stage VI 
Stage V 
Stage IV 
• Stage III 
Stage II 
► Stage I 
Individual 
Goals/Obj ectives 
Organizational 
Goals/Objectives 
* Amount of alignment between individual and organization goals/ 
objectives by stage of organizational maturation. 
(A) - Before individual or organization can move to next higher 
stage of organizational maturity, each individual and the 
organization has to sacrifice or give something up. The void 
created is filled by the relationship with the organization. 
(B) (C) - Example of a misalignment between individual and organization. 
FIGURE 8 
ALIGNMENT: PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
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vocation and advocation meet and where labor and management 
organizational lines are dissolved). As goals and objectives become 
more clearly understood and in concert between the organizational 
maturation level and the individual, alignment is nore likely and the 
opportunity for a state of synergy to exist is increased. 
Element Area:_Organizational Configuration 
This element area has often been labeled "organizational 
structure." However, the student has enlarged this element classifi¬ 
cation to enccnpass the dynamics of the elements of organizational 
growth, development, culture, and operational mode. The variables or 
elements that make up these dynamics include the following: 
- history; 
- size; 
- age; 
- mission; 
- stage of development, as adapted from Jack Gibb16 and further 
developed by Roderick Bartell17, which includes six stages: 
Stage I—autocratic; Stage II—benevolent; Stage III—formal 
pyramidal; Stage IV—participative; Stage V—emergent; and 
Stage VI—holistic; 
16Jack R. Gibb, "Iirproving Organizational Effectiveness through 
Focus on Environmental Qiality," The Cutting Edge, ed. W. Warner Burke 
(San Diego, California: University Associates, Inc., 1978), pp. 120 - 
131. 
17Roderick J. Barbell, "Small Ccranunity Development Stages," paper 
presented to the Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs, State 
College, Pennsylvania, 1983. (Typewritten.) 
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cycle of development, as developed by Ichak Adizes, which 
includes ten cycles: courtship; infancy; go-go; 
prune; maturity; aristocracy; early bureaucracy; 
and death.18 
adolescence; 
bureaucracy; 
- phase of development, as developed by Wilson Learning, which 
include: I-fomative; II-normtive; and Ill-integrative. « 
- task cycle; 
- values; 
- operating environment; 
- table of organization/structure. 
Again, these elements must act in harmony or be in alignment for 
synergy to be maximized. Organizational structure is a major element 
that must be selected to meet the needs of the organization. This area 
has been part of the organizational behavior literature from its early 
beginnings and still is of central inportance to many organizational 
theorists. Keith D. Wilcock in his book The Corporate Triber20 r takes 
the reader from early tribes to modem day corporat ional structures and 
makes a point that all have a carmen link—they all have structure. He 
18Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating 
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," p. 25. 
19Wilson Learning Corporation, Leadership Management Seminar (Eden 
Prairie, Minnesota; Wilson Learning Corporation, 1984), p. 8. 
20Keith D. Wilcock, The Corporate Tribe (Excelsior, Minnesota: 
The Wyer Pearce Press, 1984), pp. 36 - 42. 
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further suggests that the basic building block of human organizations 
is the pyramid, regardless of its configuration.21 
Many organizational concepts evolve out of structure and design, 
such as chain^f-ccranand, span of control, informal and formal 
structure, centralization and decentralization, specialization, unity 
of cannand, and matrix form.22 This author has observed that the more 
complex the organization and the lower the stage of development, the 
more preoccupied (dominant element) the organization is with structure. 
In addition, the younger the cycle, the less concern is expressed for 
formal structure and the less organizational complexity exists, in 
other words, the structural design must be aligned to intersect along 
both the horizontal "stage" axis (Gibb,23 and Bartell24) and the 
vertical "cycle" axis (Adizes25). 
The organizational structure or design must also be sensitive to 
the existing internal organizational environment and the operating 
medium or external environment in which the organization must survive. 
Therefore, structural alignment is a sensitive and complex matter that 
must be carefully studied before change is made, otherwise the 
21Ibid., p. 40. 
22Don Hellriegal, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Richard W. Woodman, 
Orqansaticnal Behavior (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 
1983), pp. 310 - 346. 
23Gibb, "Inproving Organizational Effectiveness through Focus on 
Environmental Quality," pp. 120 - 131. 
24Roderick J. Bartell, "Small Community Development Stages." 
2^Mizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating 
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," p. 25. 
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prescribed treats my only act to speed the degeneration process. 
For the organizational triage (COS) practitioner, the use of tradition 
or temporary organizational structural designs is nost helpful. 
Par example, the organization in crisis is best aligned by using 
the "cluster" management structure until a temporary stability or 
quasi-stationary level of equilibrium can be established. Once 
Stability is established and alignment is achieved, the various 
departmental units can be reintroduced to other npre conventional 
structural forms. 
For another example, if the management operates in a Stage I- 
autocratic, over directing mode—and their employee task group has 
matured to a Stage V—professional team orientation—with little need 
for uni-directional leadership, an element misalignment exists, if no 
adjustment is made, mistrust, conflict, breakdown in oomunications, 
and ultimately negative coping mechanisms will occur. The intervention 
point clearly then is one of aligning the stage of development instead 
of sane other element, such as changing the size of the work group or 
increasing the goal pressure which is most often attempted. 
Element Area: Motivation 
Althcugh often entitled "rewards" in survey instruments, again, 
this student has enlarged the meaning. This element includes the need 
for alignment of such skill factors or elements as managerial profile/ 
task unit alignment, often over-siirplified as "leadership"? need 
hierarchy; expected results; time/urgency or task internalization; task 
type and skill level achieved; work setting; fear? organizational 
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tolerance; role stress; level of aspiration; rewards; imediacy, 
clarity, and method of feedback; jcto configuration (piece work, 
professional, creative, etc.); personal situation at any given point in 
time; and competing areas of attention (rndti^ectors). These factors 
logically upact motivation. Alignment of an organizational rentier 
with these factors is critical. In most cases, all or rest are 
interacting elements that provide motivation. 
Element Area: Leadership Relations 
This element area is the interfacing of the manager with his/her 
woric team. Collectively in seme organizations it becomes management- 
labor relations. Having been involved in negotiations and arbitration 
for twenty years, this student coined the phrase leadership relations 
as a more descriptive term as it suggests a greater, multi-faceted 
level of complexity that must exist for proper alignment to occur. The 
elements include: 
- skill and knowledge; 
- managerial profile (not just style) interface with employees, 
peers and superiors; 
- written standards; 
- goal interpretation motivated by personal values; 
- power base (formal; informal; intensity—note: this includes 
coercive, legitimate, expert, referent, reward, information, 
connection/linkage, withholding, and enabling power usage); 
- power motive (personalized; socialized; affiliative) and power 
style; 
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- influence vector/valence; 
profile of people must interact with; 
- task; 
- time constraints; 
~ interpersonal skills. 
It shculd be noted that an influence vector/valence is the amount 
of influence an individual can bring to an organizational role by the 
force of one's personality exhibited as a behavior. This force is the 
number generated from the Interoersonal Check r.ist rorr.) instroment.26 
the number is the intensity of the sum of the personality traits 
that can have either a positive or negative valence. A positive 
valence is a "warro" or gregarious influence style and a negative 
valence is a "cool" or detached influence style. The valence is not to 
be confused with a "positive mental attitude" which is not addressed by 
the influence vector or valence. 
Ihe stronger the vector the more influence the person brings to 
the organization. The influence vector/valence can be sunned for a 
task group or team to determine the formation and potential influence 
of organizational "power pockets." To bring about change in an 
organization in crisis a state of temporary steady state must be 
established which can occur by equalizing the negative and positive 
vectors (the sum equals or nearly equals zero) which will allow an 
26Rolfe LaForge and Robert F. Suczek, "Interpersonal Check List 
(ICL)," The 1977 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, eds. John E. 
Jones and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego, California; University 
Associates, Inc., 1977), pp. 91 - 96. 
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external intervention team to establish the necessary influence to 
create the needed changes. 
This student has often found this element area to be fertile 
ground on which to initiate an assessment as to the source of major 
mistrust and conflict in organizations that are in decline or crisis. 
Element Area: Task ReadinPas/AHii ii-y 
This student focuses on job—employee and job—task group 
alignment. The elements that most often become misaligned arc: 
- personality of employee; 
- aptitude to perform task (such as mechanical aptitude) through 
proper selection processes; 
- experience; 
- education; 
- training; 
- orientation to the job/task; 
- motor skills and strength; 
- mental agility; 
- selection. 
A large amount of organization development effort is expended in 
developing this element area, although the "shotgun" approach towards 
training and development is not an efficient method to obtain 
alignment. Only through precise and individualized assessments can the 
alignment objective be isolated and "targeted" with development 
efforts. Most often if the skill dimension element is cut of alignment 
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and is also a d-W skill element, of ^ M 
useful for realigns as develqpinj a new skill or jcfc ability. 
Element Apeaj—Supporting Systems and Structure 
Biis element area relates to what are often called •'helpful 
inec^anisns'' that act to facilitate the operations of an organization. 
Although there are numerous elements that fall into this area, the 
primary ones that most often seem to operate are the following: 
- Administrative/Support Structure; 
- Control Systems; 
Reward Systems (Reinforcement of Good Performance); 
Oamunicaticiy^ Feedback Systems; 
Fewer Structure; 
- Motivation Systems; 
- Decision Efficiency/Style; 
- Labor Organizations/Associations ; 
- Operating Syndromes. 
Element Area: Task Group Relations 
Group relations include a host of elements that interact to form 
the substance of task groups. The elements or factors that most often 
reflect the potential ability for groups to relate include; 
- Size of Group; 
- Influence Vector/Valence; 
- Age of Group; 
- Goals and Objectives; 
Goal Pressure; 
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- Relationships ? 
- Leader Profile; 
- Task Type and Clarity; 
- Ochesiveness/Bcnding; 
- Purpose of Group; 
— Formal/ Informal Groupings; 
- Task Agreement; 
- Values; 
- Political Dynamics; 
- Trust Level; 
- Communication Patterns and Synapse Efficiency. 
Element Area: Technical Environment (internal) 
The internal technical environment consists of the alignment of 
the following predominant elements: 
- Condition of Plant; 
- Condition and Type of Equipment; 
- Type of Technology (Service/Product); 
- Raw materials Need and Availability; 
- Rate of Exchange; 
- Technology Development Curve. 
Element Area: Economic Environment (External) 
The external economic environment often creates pressure on 
internal elements. The external element points that most often impact 
the internal elements and become misaligned include the following: 
Capacity; 
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Resources (Short-TerVLong-lterTn); 
- Competition; 
~ Economy; 
- Operating Ratios; 
- Market/demand. 
Element Area: Physical Envirirynmpnt- 
Ihe physical elements that most often are impacted and become 
misaligned include, frcm experience; 
- Location; 
- Amenities of Position; 
- Shifts; 
- Safety; 
- Job Lay-out; 
- Noise; 
- Image. 
Element Area: Organizational Flexibility 
Organizational flexibility, or the ability of an organization to 
read internal and external pressures and make the appropriate 
adjustments, is probably the greatest factor in whether an organization 
becomes misaligned or not. The key elements or factors identified to 
be operating in the study of numerous organizations by this student 
include the following; 
- Task/Product/Servioe; 
- Feedback Systems; 
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- Environment Monitoring Systems; 
- Organizational Monitoring Systems; 
- Culture; 
- Stage of Development; 
- Cycle of Development; 
- Riase of Development; 
- Econcmic/Fiscal Structure; 
- Managerial Profile; 
- Stress Coping Mechanisms; 
- History; 
- Age. 
Element Area: Manaoer/Oraanization Profile Interface 
Having assessed hundreds of managers in their organizational 
context, this student has concluded that the interface between the 
operating manager's profile and the fit of this profile with the 
desired profile to create a synergistic organizational state is 
probably the most sensitive of element areas. It is also one of the 
most precise areas in which to intervene to turn around an organization 
through alignment. Although this student has been able to measure well 
over ninety managerial skill elements, the following list most often 
forms the core of the dominant acting elements. 
- style of leadership; 
- Style of Management; 
- Change Agent Style; 
- Communication Style/Pattem; 
- Decision Style; 
- Empowerment Style? 
- Intervention Style? 
- Influence Style? 
- Conflict Management Style; 
- Influence Vector/Valence; 
- Nervous/Dynamic Tension; 
- Mental Agility; 
- Dominance; 
- Work Motivation Pattern; 
- Work Style Preference? 
- Managerial/Organizational Fhilosophy; 
- Time Management; 
- Role Stress; 
“ Leadership Flexibility and Effectiveness? 
- Dominant Driving Personality Traits; 
- Work Habits (Organization/Planning) ? 
- Sociability; 
- Emotional Maturity? 
- Stress Profile? 
- Stress Coping Mechanisms/Approach; 
- Stamina? 
- Naivete. 
Ichak Adizes, in his book Hew to Solve the Mismanagement Crisis 
spent considerable time discussing how the management style must 
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interface with the cycle of develcpnent of the organization He makes 
a strong case for the need for a management style to be adjusted at 
each of nine different cycle charges an organization ray experienced 
He suggested that a management team has four basic roles that must used 
in proper proportions or-by our term-be in alignment. These roles 
were production, administration, entrepreneurial, and integration 
Depending on the cycle of development, a certain centoination 
was required to be dominant and others to be recessive or not desired 
to be present at all. For example, a strong divergent managerial style 
diagrammed as PAel is dysfunctional to organizations in their 
"infancy," "go-go," and "adolescent" stages28. However, such a style 
would be in alignment for organizations that are in a "mature" stage of 
development. 
Jack Gibb, in his ten stages of organizational development, also 
recognized the need to shift managerial styles. In fact, he suggested 
the lack of shift in style could impede an organization from moving to 
a higher stage of organizational development.29 He further stated that 
a most critical time to an organization occurs when there is a shift 
from one stage to another stage. During this period, leadership is 
27Ichak Mizes, Hcm to Solve the Mismanagement Crisis (Santa 
Monica: Mizes Institute, Inc., 1979), pp. 13 - 92. 
28Ichak Mizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating 
Lifecyle Problems of Organizations", p. 25. 
29Jack R. Gibb, "Improving Organizational Effectiveness through 
Focus on Erwironmerrtal Quality," pp. 120 - 131. 
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roost necessary and the failure to adjust 
style would inhibit the prooessSO. 
one's managerial philosophy/ 
This author has also been able to identify six stages of 
organizational evoluticn as already discussed. Alignment of managerial 
Style to stage of development has proven to be a very important factor 
m developing a healthy local government work environment; healthy 
being defined as cost effective servioe provided by a work unit that 
has high morale and a belcw average level of labor grievances, 
attrition, and citizen complaints. 
Often as an organization declines, the number of elements out of 
alignment will increase along with the intensity of the misalignment. 
Ihe efficiency of the intervention process, or the ability to sort out 
or prioritize which dominant elements need to be adjusted, must 
increase proportionately with the extent to which the organizational 
decline has occurred if the turnaround effort is to be successful. 
Inhibitors to Normal Organizational Development 
Change is the golden thread that weaves through the fabric of 
normal organization development. An organization can continue to 
develop and grew only as long as its capacity for change is not 
impeded. Once a triggering event occurs that interrupts an 
organization's normal course, a series of change phases must be worked 
through in order for the organization to reach a new condition of 
equilibrium. In other words, an organizational climate must be 
30Ibid. 
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established and maintained that gives an organization the ability to 
adapt to changing conditions. As stated before, premature exiting or 
not completing any one of these phases causes the equilibrium state to 
be less than fully realized. 
Hie types of equilibrium process malfunctioning experienced, and 
therefore labeled by this student, that act to inhibit the completion 
of the movement through the phases include: 
- "Arrest" or an inability to proceed from one state to 
another31; 
- "Short cycling" or an inability to complete a particular phase, 
and the process of the stage continues to recycle with a 
greater intensity at each cycle. Defensive patterns may 
persist and actually begin to dominate the organizational 
function completely (often expressed as a syndrome); 
- "Premature exiting" when the process is prematurely completed 
and where all of the organizational elements inpacted have not 
yet mutually reached the required threshold to move to the next 
phase; 
- "Regression" or the process of moving backward to a previous 
phase (this often occurs to compensate for a premature 
exiting); 
- "Fixation" may occur when the organization is so traumatized by 
the change event as to not allow the available coping 
31Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The Neurotic 
Organization (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 
1985), p. 163. 
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mechanisms to become activated (not unlike a car trying to 
shift gears at a high rpm without the use of a clutch) ; 
"raise phase” may occur when the movement does not go to a 
legitimate next phase, tut creates another alternative phase 
that does not lead the organization to a constructive 
equilibrium. 
Given these types of process malfunctioning exist, a series of 
questions naturally evolve: What causes a particular type of 
malfunction? What makes an organization not fully recover from a 
change? What causes an organization not to reach the former level of 
equilibrium or achieve an even greater level of balance in one's 
environment? What causes an organization not to be able to "refreeze" 
or allow the change to "take" (integrate the change into current 
operations) ? 
Fran the author's observations and buttressed by the literature 
(Baker, 197332; and Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, 198033) one finds 
that an organization that continually fails to reach the fully 
developed equilibrium state starts to degenerate or decline. Once this 
situation is initiated, further negative stimuli or the crisis state 
experienced by the organization becomes more and more difficult to cope 
with and the process recycles with increasingly devastating results. 
32Everett E. Hagen, "Analytical Models in the Study of Social 
Systems," Organizational Systems; General Systems Approaches to 
Carolex Organizations, ed. Frank Baker (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irvin, Inc., 1973), p. 78. 
33Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle, 
pp. 165 - 171. 
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This phenomenon, already labeled by this author as "disharmonic 
resonance," acts to plunge the organization into a further crisis 
state. This increasing crisis state triggers "inhibitors" that act to 
exacerbate the malfunctioning of the equilibrium development process 
and increase the organizational element misalignment. The primary 
classes of inhibitors that have been observed by the author in numerous 
consulting efforts are: defensive patterns and defense mechanisms; 
traumatized leadership? organizational blockages; and organizational 
syndromes. 
It is important to note that one or more of these inhibitors may 
be functioning at any given time? the various members, units or 
elements of an organization may be at one or more of the equilibrium 
generation phases; and the "regression" type of malfunction tends to 
operate in organizations under stress (Brenner, 1976; Nemiah, 1978).34 
Regression, as herein used, is ". . .a desire to revert back to a 
mode(s) of adaptation and behavior more appropriate to an earlier stage 
of development."35 In reality, it is a form of remembering and 
reenacting past behaviors that are new no longer applicable to the 
current state of development of the organization. 
Entrcpic Defensive Patterns or Defense Mechanisms 
Typically, defensive patterns or defense mechanisms are called 
upon as a temporary coping organizational behavior that can act to 
34Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 229. 
35Ibid., pp. 137 - 138. 
81 
reestablish a new condition for equilibrium. However, from 
considerable observation of organizations moving into a pre-crisis or 
cxisis state, the defensive patterns or defense mechanisms take on a 
different dimension. The literature also suggests such a phenomenon 
may exist as expressed by Mmro, 1974,36 and Kets de Vries and Miller, 
1984.37 under such pre-crisis or crisis conditions, the defensive 
patterns seem to persist and even begin to dominate organizational 
functions completely and act to inhibit attempts to achieve a new state 
of homeostasis. 
Sucii defensive patterns or defense mechanisms act not unlike an 
over-abundance of white cells in the body that attack the red cells of 
the body. Normally the white cells are constructive, but can become 
destructive under certain conditions; so it seems with defensive 
patterns and defense mechanisms that are triggered when an individual 
or organization experiences acute anxiety. The overuse and/or 
inappropriate usage of such defensive patterns or defense mechanisms 
seem to be at the core of the problem. (Often managers use defensive 
mechanisms as an all-purpose management tool when other pro-active 
tools and strategies would better address the situation.) 
As Kets de Vries and Miller write: 
"We should keep in mind, however, that all these 
arrests (defense mechanisms included) in the working 
through process may occur in the transformation toward 
successful change. What distinguishes their 
36Jim L. Munro, Administrative Behavior and Police Organization, 
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Ccnpany, 1974), p. 128. 
37Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, pp. 22 - 42. 
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dysfunctional nature is sinply their tenacity and 
Ihe primary defensive mechanisms that have been most frequently 
observed by this author in his work with organizations in the pre¬ 
crisis or crisis state include the following. 
Denial is the most observed defense mechanism. Executives; boards 
of directors; and, to a lesser extent, lower line and staff personnel 
will deny the reality of the situation or state of affairs and cling to 
the past.39 This behavior continues the degeneration of the situation. 
When taken to the extreme and the situation continues to degenerate, 
there is a perceived and/or real withdrawal of status or respect which 
may lead to manic behavior; which may be very aggressive and 
destructive to the organization.40 This author has experienced such 
acts in extreme cases to be appropriately labeled sabotage of the 
organization. 
Displacement is another defensive maneuver. In this maneuver 
affected organizational parts or units redirect their anger away from 
the responsible party and toward someone or something else such as a 
person, institution, object, unit, or department.41 This displaced 
blame can fool even the experienced organizational diagnostician in 
that even though the source of the problem is actually wrongly 
38Ibid., p. 165. 
39Ibid., p. 141. 
40Ibid., p. 142. 
41Ibid., pp. 163 - 164. 
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identified, there will be an agreement in responses obtained using 
traditional data sailing techniques. This consensus may then lead to 
a "false positive" and solutions are built on a wrong prause. 
cognitive disconnection sets up a third and fourth type of defense 
pattern of repressing and splitting. Cognitive disconnection occurs 
when "... the emotional responses are uncoupled from the situation 
that elicited them . . ."42 m impression, unacceptable perceptions, 
ideas, and impulses are removed from direct awareness.« For example, 
an executive keeps forgetting to write a memo about a negative 
organizational condition, tut keeps premising to write the memo. 
Splitting is found to exist in a most observable fashion in public 
sector organizations from this author's experience. Splitting often 
creates two groups - "we” and "they.” The hostile energy is directed 
toward the latter group.44 When splitting is taken to the extreme, a 
paranoid view of the world exists and one must be prepared for attack 
and be able to handle the "worst case" situation. 
The fifth defense mechanism is where the individuals or groups 
will themselves assume the "scapegoat" role. With this defense 
mechanism, the troubled individuals or groups personally assmw> the 
responsibility for the blame instead of looking for other sources of 
blame. This process may result in consistent reproaching for minor 
42Ibid., p. 164. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
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events, a tendency towards accident proneness, extreme learned 
helplessness, and passivity.45 
Another defense mechanism is called the "Lone Ranger Syndrome.»46 
This behavior acts to signal to those involved that an individual or 
group does not need help and no one else is needed. Inplied with this 
defense mechanism is that no one can do the job right so the executive 
will do it himself/herself. This defense mechanism also can be seen as 
a cover-up for one's overreaction to a feeling of helplessness, and 
therefore takes on the air of independence. 
Other more common defense mechanisms observed include projection, 
transference, conversion, rationalization, reaction formation or over- 
oarpensation, displacement, sublimation, and passive-aggressive 
behavior.47 The first six defense mechanisms defined above cue 
organizational defensive patterns that are more easily observable in a 
group setting. The last nine (projection, transference, etc.) are more 
often observed in individual employees and could be classified as 
individual defense mechanisms. 
Several of these defenses have been observed operating 
simultaneously in very troubled organizations. The factor of multiple 
operating defenses makes diagnosing the source of actual organizational 
problem(s) often difficult. When these defensive patterns and defense 
45Ibid. 
46Ibid. 
47Munro, Administrative Behavior and Police Organization, pp. 128 
- 129. 
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■"echani^ are taken to the e*tre»e e»er a tag period of tire, they 
beccre entrepic or act to create a conditta -here a state of 
equilibrium is not easy to achieve and further degenerate or declire 
occxxrs at a geometric rate. 
It is interesting to note that through careful historical tracing 
of a chief executive officer's defense mechanisms, one can see a 
"downshifting" fran a more acceptable to a less acceptable defense 
mechanism as his/her organization continues to deteriorate. This can 
often be used as a clue to help establish the rate and period of tire 
the organization has been declining. 
Traumatized leadership 
The managerial skills needed for turnaround and the realignment of 
the elements are too often lacking and the termination occurs. The 
first major managerial requirement is to be able to be sensitive to the 
movement of dominant elements into misalignment. If an organization 
does not have adequate trust between its members to allow for the free 
flew of cxxnmjnicaticn and feedback, management is already at a 
disadvantage. If management does not constantly monitor the evaluation 
of the organization and adapt the policies, procedures, behaviors, 
support systems, structure, style, and climate, to name a few dominant 
elements, misalignment will occur and will be allowed to develop long 
before detection can be made. This student has observed that there 
seems to be a rather strong correlation between the insensitivity of 
managers and their inability to act predictably or respond in an 
adequate fashion to reverse misalignment. 
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As figure 9 on page 87 illustrates, the misalignment continues 
whether detected or not. As more time passes, the severity of the 
misalignment is greater. Not being sensitive allows the misalignment 
to develop in severity, and therefore requires a greater level of 
managerial skills to reverse this condition. As shown, if the manager 
does not detect the misalignment, incorrectly diagnoses the source and 
elements cut of alignment, improperly develops a strategy of 
intervention, hesitates to implement a chosen strategy (even if 
correct), or inadequately applies the intervention strategy, time still 
continues. In other words, the organization continues to degenerate 
independently of anything but the proper (type and amount) application 
of intervention protocol. 
The second major managerial requirement is to have the managerial 
skills, traits, and abilities known as a managerial profile. Although 
this student has been able to classify managerial profiles into 
nineteen general groups, figure 9 further collapses these nineteen 
groups into four major profile categories. These four major profile 
categories are: maintenance manager profile, development manager 
profile, change-agent manager profile, and crisis manager profile. 
When placed on a continuum, as shown on figure 9, from maintenance 
manager to crisis manager, the managerial skill level becomes clear. 
The maintenance manager is conventional in his/her knowledge and 
skill level of management and organizational operations. A majority of 
managers fall within this profile category. This is probably due to 
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TO REVERSE ORGANIZATIONAL DEGENERATION 
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the notion that a majority of managerial learning cones firm role 
modeling and most role models fall within this category. 
The second category or development manager profile has a higher 
level of maturity as a manager. This type of manager has a well 
developed desire and the skills to develop his/her organization and its 
members. Fewer managers fall within this category, but still a 
reasonable number exist within this category. Having been involved 
with the selection of executives for many years, it has been this 
student's experience that, as an average, between ten and fifteen out 
of fifty applicants fit this profile. 
The third category is the change-agent. Even fewer of these type 
individuals are found in this student's work with several thousand 
managers. If five in fifty applicants have this profile it is 
considered a bit unusual. This category contains managers that have 
highly specialized and refined skills in organization change and 
transformation. These individuals are truly masters of their craft and 
possess a good knowledge base. 
The fourth category, the crisis manager or managerial heros, are 
rarely seen in organizations. There are four reasons. One, most 
managers have never worked under a crisis manager long enough to obtain 
the skills. Two, most organizations do not operate regularly in the 
crisis mode, and therefore there is little opportunity to practice 
these skills and little need to use these skills. Three, the typical 
crisis manager profile is such that they need a crisis to feel 
comfortable, needed, and successful as a manager. To keep a crisis 
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manager employed in an organization not in crisis tends to cause 
conflict. The crisis manager may, on occasion, allow misalignments to 
intentionally develop so they, as managers, can once again have value 
to the organization. If they do not set up crisis situations, they 
still attack an organization or managerial problem from their crisis 
managerial perspective which results in over-ocnpensaticn and a new 
misalignment. Fourth, it is not natural for people to like crisis and 
the stress it often generates. People tend to want to avoid 
confrontation, risk taking, making radical changes based on limited 
data, and taking the point position in implementing radical changes. 
Therefore, this student sees fewer than one crisis manager for every 
two hundred managers. The result of this lew number of crisis managers 
available suggests that the formulation of crisis management teams 
external to established organizations is a logical alternative. 
When one looks at figure 9, found on page 87, it becomes clear 
that as the lag in time increases from misalignment occurrence to the 
point of intervention, the skill level required is greatly increased, 
but the probability that the needed skill or managerial profile will be 
available is greatly decreased. 
Traumatized leadership is then defined as when an individual or 
group of individuals is placed in a leadership position and is not 
experienced in dealing with the stress that occurs from a 
malfunctioning change process or an organization that is resisting a 
needed change for survival (required coping). 
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Each manager has his/her own managerial profile that is made up of 
several managerial, personal, and technical skill dimensions. Each of 
these dimensions varies from individual to individual as to the level 
of development achieved. The ability to managerially and personally 
cepe with stress, crisis, and change then depends on the individual's 
profile or the level of maturity, the operating range within each 
dimension, and the flexibility to operate within this range. The more 
developed the dimension, the greater the operating range and the ease 
by which one moves from one style to another style along a given 
dimension, the greater the probability of the manager to be able to 
effectively cepe with organizational, operational, and environmental 
stress causing events. 
The greater the level of stress and crisis conditions in an 
organization, the closer the manager should be to having a "crisis 
manager*' profile which is significantly different than the more 
traditional "maintenance manager" profile. The maintenance manager 
placed in a crisis organizational climate can easily become traumatized 
which acts not unlike "managerial paralysis" as the individual seems to 
"freeze up" under such conditions. When this "freeze up" occurs, the 
manager/leader often becomes inflexible; selects a defense mechanism 
and becomes preoccupied with its use? oily uses a "lew risk" management 
style that does not proactively address the problem areas; and often 
spends exceptional energy in documenting and retaining the documenta¬ 
tion of every action taken via memos, letters, taping meetings, etc., 
in order to offer "proof" in defense of his/her actions. 
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Organizational RlorJovy^ 
As Kufcerly, et. al (1980) wrote as to the cause of organizational 
calamities, "Corporate calamities are caused by calamities created by 
people,"48 so is the source of organizational blockages. Woodcock ard 
Francis (1975) wrote with regard to organizational prcblens, "All of 
the problems and difficulties we have described are, basically, people 
problems, which can be seen as organizational blockages that rW-r-^c^ 
the efficiency of the system as a whole."49 For interested readers, 
the book Unblocking Your Organization by Woodcock and Francis is 
recommended. 
Although the blockages identified by Woodcock and Francis are 
quite useful for client explanation purposes, it should be noted, from 
the organizational diagnostic perspective, they do not explain how they 
evolve or the cause-effect relationship the blockage has on the 
organization's ability to achieve a condition of equilibrium and the 
ultimate change required. From this writer's study of complex 
organizations in the various stages of pre-crisis and crisis, he would 
suggest further research into organizational blockages—their 
development and impact. Such research may provide substantial 
information towards the study and diagnostics of organizational decline 
and/or failure. 
48Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle, 
pp. 360 - 361. 
49Mike Woodcock and Dave Francis, Unblocking Your Organization 
(San Diego, California: University Associates, Inc., 1975), pp. 25 - 34 
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The results of a rather simple research effort conducted by this 
student along with several different consulting tasks helps support 
this statement. By using an organizational diagnostic method called 
ECOO analysis (episodic ccnmmication channels in organization) the 
blockage of "inadequate control" and, in particular, the ccrammications 
aspect of this blockage was studied. 
Nine organizations were analyzed that were similar in size and 
services provided. In the nine organizational cases studied, seven 
were classified as being in crisis (as generally agreed by the 
employees, managers, and Boards of Directors) and two were judged as 
not being in crisis, although not without organizational problems. All 
seven "in crisis" organizations showed a channel blockage at one or 
more critical points, primarily between top executive management and 
the board of directors and/or chief executive officer or between top 
executive management and top level line management. This consultant 
labeled this observed channel blockage phenomenon as "synapse 
breakdown." 
In other words, the organizational individuals were operating not 
unlike the region of contact between two or more nerve cells across 
which an impulse is sent, but that is not getting a good connection and 
incomplete signals are received. It was further interesting to note 
that the "synapse breakdown" occurred when there was a conflicting 
style of management exhibited between the "effector" and the "receptor" 
and there was a significant difference between vector (influence) 
intensity and/or significant similarity of the valence of the vector. 
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An additional observation was made that in all seven "crisis” 
cases, a DVAL (Deviation Anplifying loop) Syndrome was well into the 
development stages or definitely existed, and in the most critical 
cases two or more syndromes were almost fully developed or were fully 
developed. Hie SER (Subcptimum Entropy Reduction) Syndrome was the 
second most often observed syndrome to be identified. 
In the two "non-crisis" cases, no "synapse breakdown" was observed 
and control was considered in the normal zone according to the 
instruments used, which were the Survey of Mananpn^nt Prartif^50 
(Clark, 1982) and by the Woodcock and Francis Blockage Diagnostic 
Questionnaire (1979).51 Hie Styles of leadership gn™oy52 ^ ^ 
Styles of Management Inventory53 were in general agreement and the 
influence vectors were either low and/or of opposite polarity in terms 
of valence. 
Similar field studies have been conducted in other blockage areas 
by this writer which have furthered his diagnostic ability and general 
understanding of the dynamics of organizational intra-actions of key 
elements. Blockage research could be a very fertile ground for the 
organizational development and behavior researcher. 
50Clark L. Wilson, Survey of Management Practices. 
51Woodcock and Francis, Unblocking Your Organization, pp. 25 - 34. 
52Jay Hall and Martha S. Williams, Styles of tAirship Survey 
(Hie Woodlands, Texas: Telecmetrics International, 1986). 
53Jay Hall, Jerry B. Harvey, and Martha S. Williams, Styles of 
Management Inventory (Hie Woodlands, Texas: Telecmetrics 
International, 1986). 
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Organizational SvrriTrrre 
Currently, the use of the term and identification of organiza¬ 
tional syndromes is at best a descriptive term used by some 
organizational researchers and consultants. Normally the term is used 
in the same general way as used in the medical profession. A syndrome 
in the medical context is a pattern of symptoms that exist within a 
disease. In an organization context, a syndrome is a "group of 
observable signs and/or synptans that occur together and characterize a 
particular abnormality."54 Rets de Vries and Miller write: ». 
troubled firms whose symptoms and dysfunctions ccntoine to form an 
integrated 'syndrome' of pathology."55 
This author, unfamiliar with the use of the term by other 
organizational consultants, noted ccnmon sets of organizational 
behaviors that existed between a large number of police departments 
with which he consulted over a course of seme twelve years. Therefore, 
in 1982, the author began the process of collating, classifying, and 
labeling recurrent behaviors that as a group would act as symptene of a 
particular chronic organizational problem. Later, while researching 
for this dissertation, the author found the term was being used by 
others. 
Stanley Sherman, president of University Center, a consulting firm 
in Waltham, Massachusetts, identified an organizational phenomenon 
54Roderick J. Barbell, "Police Department Diseases," State 
College, Pennsylvania, 1982. (Typewritten.) 
55Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 17. 
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where one's staff fires the boss long before the boss is actually 
terminated by the employing organization. He goes on to say*'. . it 
is almost a syndrome ...» and specifies some of the synptcns to 
include a decline in enthusiasm, morale, or quality of work; increased 
grumbling about policies; and higher absenteeism. He further suggests 
"the best preventive medicine" as being a good system of constant 
feedback. 58 Kets de Vries and Miller in their book The Neurotic 
Organization use the term "Lone Ranger Syndrome," but in the context of 
a defensive pattern.57 However, they make the observation that "... 
we are able to identify the symptomatology of organizations, 
particularly those that are performing poorly or are undergoing a 
disruptive period of change."58 By conceptualizing, categorizing, and 
explaining, organizational problem "frameworks" can then be applied to 
help "diagnose organizational problems more quickly and 
accurately . . ,"59 
As observed by this author, an organization may be at various 
stages of developing the manifestations or symptoms of a syndrome. It 
has also been observed that an organization may work on more than one 
syndrome at a time and, therefore, the syndromes will be at different 
55Judy Linscott, "Bosses Who Don't care About People Could be 
'Fired' by Employees," Centre Daily Times. 13 December 1984, p. B7. 
57Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 164 - 165. 
58 Ibid. 
59Ibid. 
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stages of developnent; sane say be fully developed and sane In just the 
forming stages. 
Another finding by the author is that a* syajrane can influence 
(weaken) the organizational state and climate in such a way as to make 
the organization susceptible to another syndrome. 
As written by Kets de Vries and Miller, "the difference between 
'normal' and 'neurotic' is one of degree . . ."60 so it has been found 
by this author that even relatively healthy organizations manifest seme 
of the symptoms of a syndrome, but the syndrome does not play an 
important role in inhibiting the movement through the phases needed to 
establish a condition supportive of equilibrium. From numerous 
diagnostic efforts syndromes seem to have an increasingly negative 
impact on organizations as they evolve through the pre-crisis phases to 
the crisis state. In severe crisis states, the syndrome (often 
several) becomes so pervasive in influence that the organization uses 
up a major portion of its resources and managerial energies in 
"feeding" or meeting the needs of the syndrome to ensure its full 
actualization. In other words, the syndromes as a generic group or 
class of organizational equilibrium inhibitors become a "pseudo-goal" 
to the host organization where the primary purpose of the organization 
becomes secondary. This acts to drain off reserve energies, resources, 
and/or available time. This draining process, labeled as "bleeders" by 
this author, is often as damaging as the syndrome itself in that the 
resources, time, and managerial energies typically needed to 
60Ioid. 
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proactively address a crisis situation are no longer available, in 
fact, the draining off process tends to cause the organization to 
beoane increasingly inflexible to deal with the needed charge in that 
the organization no longer has the resources needed. Fbr example, the 
climate that evolves from certain types of syndromes often is not 
compatible with the needs of key technical and managerial employees 
that could assist in the development of a turnaround. Instead, these 
employees are often seme of the first to leave the organization. 
The study of the types and dynamics of syndromes and their 
degenerative effect on organizations should be explored further by 
organizational researchers. It is felt that such research would lead 
to greater understanding of the interactions of organizations in 
crisis. 
Numerous crisis management consulting assignments have allowed 
several significant syndromes to be identified, analyzed, classified, 
named, and observed in operative forms. Eight such syndromes have been 
observed to actively inhibit the formulation of a condition that allows 
for equilibrium to occur. These are discussed below. 
The Suboptirum Entropy Reduction (SER) Syndrome basically operates 
as the name implies. The organizational entity creates its own "sub- 
organization” that acts without consideration of the goals of the 
parent organization and only cares about its own goal of reducing the 
discomfort of being part of a degenerating organization. The SER 
syndrome exxurs when an organization internally evolves to counter and 
fill a void created by an inappropriate managerial style which inhibits 
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a "formal" management structure frcm forming. Sea* of the primary 
synptans include the following: 
SSEtcffis: Tcp management manifests unique am often counter- 
productive behavior, such as: 
- Creating reactive department policies to "ccntoat" or respond to 
individual or isolated employee behaviors; 
- Making hasty decisions and then countermanding them within a 
very short period of time (for example: suspending an employee 
then allowing the employee to make-up money lost by scheduling 
him/her for overtime assignments); 
- Acquiring organizational power through organizational confusion 
created by rumor and conflict? 
- Paralyzed decision-making even when the "best" course of action 
seems clear; 
- Rigidity in allowing change (even in routine day-to-day 
situations such as scheduling); 
- Inability to be consistent in delegation of responsibilities— 
often the responsibility is taken back or even abdicated; 
- Tendency to retain documents, materials, etc., beyond their 
useful life or required purge cycle—basically for alleged 
"CYA" purposes? 
- Failure to place himself/herself in critical situations where 
leadership is necessary for fear of exposure to uncertainty in 
his environment; 
- Reactionary management style. 
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Subordinates manifest the following behavior: 
- A distinct change in organizational "climate" occurs when the 
chief administrator is not present in ccnpariscn with the time 
when he/she is present; 
- Middle management/supervision shows signs of frustration due to 
role confusion or lack of role definition (may even resign 
position); 
- Unit may consist (on the average) of an older group of 
employees; 
- Attrition rate is not initially a serious problem, although it 
logically should be; 
- Enployees exude a group closeness and general cooperation with 
one another; 
- Enployees are quick to openly laugh at or chide the management, 
tut are equally quick to defend the services or level of 
production being provided; 
- Statistics will confirm services are being provided to the 
community in spite of internal organizational problems (this 
holds true for the public sector, but may not be the situation 
in the private sector); 
- Although firm orders and policies are seldom stated with this 
syndrome, when such are stated or occur, there is not a 
predictable and direct cause-effect relationship or change in 
the actual employee performanoe/behavior (similar to a 
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situation where a steering wheel is not attached to the wheels 
of a car); 
- Employees have a true sense of pride even to a point of havirg 
a oonflict as to what really is the esprit de corps of their 
work unit. "Their" work unit has good morale, but the overall 
"department” has poor morale. 
Hie Deviation Anplifying Loop (DVAL) Syndrome is an often observed 
syndrome in organizations in pre-crisis and crisis. This syndrome 
seems to often exist before others take clear form in troubled 
organizations. Although no rule can be generated from one's 
experience, this writer would suggest to the serious organizational 
diagnostic consultant that a time saving starting place to determine 
the level of an organization's level of dysfunction is to start with 
charting a "caused, map". 
First described by Maruyama in 1963, this has been further applied 
successfully to organizational events, specifically in the public 
sector. Che can identify such a syndrome when the primary 
organizational components (variables) are charted in a causal map. 
(Recently Bougon, Weick and Binkjorst? 1977, have reported using a 
caused, mapping methodology to "make sense" of the organizational 
declining process.)61 Taking one of the interdependent variables, a 
pathway is traced until the interaction eventually leads back to the 
original variable. The caused reactions are charted as a positive 
61Bougon, M., Weick, K., and Binkjorst, D., "Cognition in 
Organizations: An Analysis of the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra," 
Administrative Science CUarterlv. 1977, Volume 22, pp. 606 - 639. 
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reaction (ary variable increases the next variable's output) or 
negative reaction (ary variable decreases the output of the next 
sequential variable). An even rumber of negative signs indicates a 
deviation-sinplifying effect or loop. 
Key organizational synptcms of the DVAL syndrome are: 
- Accountability is decreased (for exanple: overtime is given 
without well justified need or concern for fairness), stated 
policies are vague, at best; 
- There is a rapid decrease in control and regulation of 
departmental operations; 
- The work unit shows synptcms of instability and the increasing 
degeneration of these synptcms (for exarple: rumors are 
circulated and become more bizarre); 
- Piecemeal efforts are attempted to solve specific problem 
situations which result in little or no change; 
- Reorganization efforts do little to resolve the problem. 
Erplcyee synptcms of the ENAL syndrome are: 
- Role confusion between elected officials/boards of directors, 
and the chief executive officer/department heads; 
- Over-attention to details and interplay over critical incidents 
within the department; 
- Desire to place blame or find a victim rather than identify the 
solution; 
- Subliminal power struggles within the work unit and at the 
policy making level; 
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Lack of pro—active management; 
- Development ara^or selection of poor techniques or strategies 
for coping with stress/anxiety; 
- lack of formal ccmmnicaticn procedures with the work unit 
(monthly meetings, use of memos, etc.); 
- No vision or clearly defined future for the organizational 
unit; 
- No formalized problem solving system (custcmer/citizen 
complaint procedure) ? 
- Little supervision and on-line development of the core 
operative personnel; 
- An analysis of the climate of the work unit is described as 
cloudy or partially cloudy by the majority of the personnel; 
- Morale of the work unit is typically stated to be between 1 and 
4 on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest) by the majority 
of the personnel. 
A diagram of hew this system can operate and cause further 
degeneration is found in figure 10, found on page 103. This exaitple 
was developed to describe the dynamics operating in a specific client's 
organization. 
The third syndrome is the Organizational Internal Dissonance 
Occurrence (OIDO) Syndrome. This syndrome basically occurs where there 
is an inproper aligning of one or more of dominant organizational 
elements, such as: 
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NOTE: A causal loop with an even number of negative signs 
indicates a lack of regulation or control. Once a variable begins to 
move in a particular direction (in this case down), the variable will 
continue to move in that same direciton until the system is destroyed 
or until sane dramatic change occurs. 
FIGURE 10 
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF DWAL (DEVIATION AMPLIFYING LOOP) 
SYNDROME AS OPERATES IN DEPARTMENT/MANAGER 
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Organizational/oorporate culture, including: 
- Power culture (source, intensity, vector, and valence) ; 
- Role culture? 
- Task culture (task cycles) ? 
- Person culture. 
- Environment adaptation, including: 
- Adaptation by deliberation; 
- Adaptation by reproduction; 
- Adaptation by differentiation (most often found in the 
public sector). 
- Managerial style, including: 
- Fran autocratic to democratic. 
- Organizational structure, including: 
- Web/matrix; 
- Traditior^/hierarchial ? 
- Net; 
- Cluster. 
- Stage and cycle of organizational development, including 
between work units. 
- Decision-making? 
- Work style preference - actual versus preferred. 
This syndrome seems to be triggered by internal or external 
stress, such as: budget reduction, unusual personnel growth, 
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improperly calculated "motivation calculus/*62 change in service 
requirements (population decrease, rapid market share change, etc.) or 
other factor(s). 
Svnptcms: 
Often explained as a "zig-zag" of the management from the body 
of the organization. This is where the department has changed 
or is changing and one or more of the administrators/policy 
makers are continuing on the former path while the body of the 
organization is being directed towards a new path. 
- Work unit/chief executive offioer/employees lose credibility, 
"can't be trusted," "don't knew if they are telling the truth, 
exaggerating the real situation or just trying to build their 
empire." The main characteristic is mistrust of the 
"reoamnended" solution put forth by the in-house experts or 
change agents. 
- Complex "games" are played between work unit members, ranks, 
positions, roles such as labor/management, 
management/technical, mayor/administrator, sales/production. 
Power struggles are not unusual. 
- Use of information is a major point of power or leverage as 
well as its misuse. 
- "Idiosyncrasy credit" is in use (a leader's degree of freedom 
relates to the amount of credits his/her group has given 
62Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 41. 
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him/her for spending on "deviant" behavior-ooined by E. P. 
Hollander, 1964).63 
- Employees (all levels) feel the "reality" of the jcb has not 
lived up to the "urage" of the job presented by management 
(dissonance theory—Hardy) .64 
Often a work unit or department will manifest a ••proactive" or 
even a secretive behavior. For exairple, a police department might: 
- Classify all of their cases as confidential ? 
- Speak of '•political interference" with the department's 
operations; 
- Suggest a "we against the world" attitude; 
- Provide extreme rationalization of failures or problems ; 
- Not offer open ocmnunication with elected officials; 
- Try to get members of the elected official body to be on "our 
side" or suggest some are "pro-police" while suggesting others 
are "anti-police"; 
- Informal intimidation may be used such as "you have to be a 
cop" to really understand, or "you should see our files on 
_" (suggesting inproper activity by an elected 
official); 
- "Poor morale" is used as the rationale for department 
inefficiency. 
63Ibid., p. 103. 
64Ibid., p. 137. 
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Often a process called "aimuniticn counting’' occurs in this 
syndrcrae whereby each side openly reiterates to those not directly 
involved how nuch evidence one has against one's foe. This evidence is 
treated like anmuniticn which is stockpiled? counted often; but seldcm, 
if ever, used. The age of this "ainamition" is often so old when 
checked cut by an interventionist (scmetimes as old as six to eight 
years) that it would not "fire" even if used. The triage team knows 
the crux of the problem is being addressed when the "counting" ceases. 
The fourth syndrome is the Resource Imbalance Syndrome (RIS). 
Sinply stated, this syndrome most often occurs in small organizations 
or autonomous work units in rapidly changing environments. Such 
changes could be due to high technology advancement; "hot," highly 
competitive and profitable markets? rapid population decrease or 
increase; change in neighborhood make-up; or a tax base shift that 
impacts the service department resources. This can be a too rapid 
budget increase due to external funds as well as too little. 
In the business ccnirunity, a "boom time" that results in 
uncontrolled growth often provides the condition for this syndrome to 
develop. 
Svnptcms: Care should be taken that this syndrome is not confused 
with the OIDO syndrome where "empire building" is one of its 
characteristics. Some general characteristics include; 
- A wide variance from the operating norm on any ’’benchmarking" 
dimension used in the industry (for exanple: a high cost per 
unit ccnpared to costs of similar producers); 
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- low energy of employees (often expressed as low performance 
rate, sick days, etc.) due to rotation and overtime fatigue; 
High use of overtime required by managanent arri difficulty in 
finding employees to work these time periods; 
- Short shifting? 
- Numerous schedule changes within short time period (often 
schedule is changed even before it is posted); 
- Performance time increases as an average for the same time 
period one to three years ago; 
- "Pockets" of boredom exist and employees try to create 
challenges or diversions that may or may not be positive; 
- Overall image of operation is less than sharp—from dirty 
equipment to dirty work area to poor personal appearance; 
- Budget adjustments are constantly taken from contingency fund 
category or capital fund categories and budget overruns still 
occur; 
- Needed equipment is often dcwn for repairs; 
- Role overload or underload exists in more than isolated cases 
(under-employed or over-employed seems to be an operating 
concept here). 
The fifth syndrome is the Chronic Organizational Stress Reaction 
(OOSR) syndrome. In common terms, this occurs when the stress from 
internal or external pressures gets to the point where change is very 
necessary (even possibly for survival), but the tension from fear of 
failure is so high that management is unable to take one more risk so 
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they hold on to their unsatisfactory performance. An analogy has been 
nade of a driver at the wheel of a car cn ice that goes into a skid and 
just clutches the wheel, doing nothing to react to reduce the skid. 
Symptoms: 
- Significant resistance to change by administrators and top 
policy makers. No interest in change "sponsorship," but would 
rather endorse a previous method of doing something, if 
anything at all. 
- There is a general denied that a significant problem exists. 
- High attrition rate of more progressive personnel regardless of 
age. Early retirements often occur. 
- Decisions are put off or "tabled" for the next meeting. (This 
is often because of fear of the unknown—the unknown is 
uncertain and unpredictable.) The primary issue normally 
revolves around the control and vulnerability of management. 
- Traditional solutions, management approaches, and tools that 
have worked in the past do not seem to work new. 
- The stress shows itself in unusual defense manifestations; 
i.e., tough behavior, passive aggressive behavior, approach- 
avoidance, and in general, "resistant" attitude. 
- Attrition increases. 
With this syndrome, management's inability to proactively address 
the factors (internal and external) that are placing pressure on the 
organization creates job tension for the employees. The continuous 
inaction by management to take corrective steps to reduce this employee 
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job tension is interpreted by the agployees as lack of concern or even 
lack of ocrmtinent on the part of management. The employees at this 
point start to experience both the feeling of job tension and 
organizational abandonment or at least the withholding of the 
organization's oamdtment to the employees. The extent of this feeling 
will vary with each individual enployee. However, as these feelings 
intensify, a withdrawal process begins to occur. Once this state is 
reached, given that the two basic conditions of job tension and low 
organizational commitment continue, it is highly probable that the 
individual will terminate his/her employment. 
This whole process was developed and entitled as the "Cusp 
Catastrophe Model of Enployee Turnover*' by Sheridan and Abel son 
(1983) .65 Their follcw-up research suggested that once a threshold was 
met or a "bifurcation plane" was crossed, termination would occur more 
often than not. This OOSR syndrome seems to often set up the condition 
for the crossing of this "bifurcation plane." 
As a note to organizational diagnosticians, one often finds a 
"premature mortality" (Adizes, 1979, definitial) at me of the growth 
cycles coupled with a growth stage dissonance (Gibb model, 1978) of two 
or more stages between internally operating departments with the 
identification of this OOSR syndrome. Whether this situation exists 
before or because of the syndrome is not known. 
The sixth syndrome is the Foundation Degeneration Syndrome (FDS). 
This syndrome could also be called the "false organization" in that 
65Academy of Management Journal. 1983, pp. 418 - 436. 
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several of the basic elements needed in a formal organization do not 
exist. Such elanents that should exist in a viable organization, but 
may not exist or exist only partially in an TO affected organization 
include: 
- Stated and understood mission, goals and/or objectives; 
- Stated in written form and passed by resolution-formal policy, 
procedures, work rules, etc.; 
- Formal job descriptions, employment standards, selection 
criterion exist; 
- Recognized leadership exists that can influence other key 
members of the organization (no managerial vacuum exists); 
- Decision-making processes reduce the equivocality of an issue; 
- Personnel development and maintenance programs are in effect ; 
- Evaluation and feedback mechanisms exist and are in effect; 
- Stated linkages or relationships exist between organizational 
elements and members; 
- Information handling is systematic with little "channel noise." 
This syndrome seems to occur when the organization was not 
"planned" or "designed" into existence, but evolved over time and the 
increasing demand for service, product, accountability, and budget 
controls created ,fbreak points" or organizational problems. 
Svirptons: Numerous key factors or organizational "building 
blocks" are lacking that are required to form a strong organizational 
foundation, as presented above. Numerous "break points" will occur. 
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These "break points" are often expressed in such ccnments or feelings 
as: 
- "We have lost so nuch control that we never can get a case of 
discipline to stick." 
- "Too much time is spent on paperwork." 
- "Why do the employees want to side-step their supervisor and 
ccme to us (me) with their gripes?" (The end run problem.) 
- Tcp management targets the department/capany as only a "chip" 
to be used to gain other objectives (often personal agenda 
items) or labels the department as a "necessary evil" that must 
be put up with, but does nothing to advance the image/growth of 
the cxxinunity/ccBpany. 
Often these "break points" are rather subtly inferred, but are 
important cues to the manager and consultant alike. It should be noted 
that this syndrome, left untreated, will most often lead to more 
serious organizational problems. 
The seventh syndrome is the Intervention Rejection Syndrome (IRS). 
This syndrome only manifests itself when a change (intervention) is 
made (or attempted) and the organization resists or even rejects the 
intervention? be it a new system, disturbance of political equilibrium, 
a new chief executive, changing policy, introduction to a new type of 
technology, equipment, etc. Normally this is a reaction to a fear that 
a lack of control or that a position of vulnerability will result. 
Also, IRS occurs when there is a difficult reality that has to be faced 
by the organization. 
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Svnptcms: 
- Sudden fornulaticn of a bargaining unit—even obtaining 
national union affiliation; 
- Use of end runs to perceived "power individual" not directly 
involved in the process; 
- Use of press coverage to present the position of the 
department/ agency; 
- Direct challenge (or attack) to the change stated as: 
- "Give me more details so we can understand it"; 
- Moralizing (makes use of phrases: "those people" and 
"should" and "they need to understand/' etc.); 
- Flooding the change agent with details of why it cannot 
work; 
- Challenging the "base line data" as to accuracy of data 
collection approach, analytical approach, etc.; 
- Intellectual izes or provides numerous theories of why things 
are the way they are and why the intervention might not be 
appropriate; 
- Confusion or "I don't understand" is expressed even after it 
is clearly explained two or three times; 
- Silence (silence never means consent during an intervention 
process). 
- Sudden state of "health" occurs—the problem has suddenly 
diminished; 
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Over-ccnplianoe when a normally challenginj/aggressive manager 
eagerly wants to knew what to do next; 
- "I am not surprised” approach when in reality surprise would be 
a normal reaction; 
- Overt or covert sabotage of the project. 
The eighth often observed syndrome is when the employees or staff 
fire the boss, as described by Sherman and discussed previously. 
Collectively, these syndromes represent seme of the more serious 
inhibitors to setting-up the organization condition necessary to reach 
the equilibrium needed for the change process to be completed. More 
simply stated, syndromes are really types of organizational illnesses. 
When classified as such, it allows the organizational diagnostician a 
point of reference or “working hypothesis" as to what is occurring in 
an organization to cause the problem® manifested. With experience, one 
can relatively quickly "scan" a complex organization, hypothesize what 
transactions are occurring within the organization, select the 
appropriate organizational diagnostic tool or data collection method, 
and analyze the results and verify the scope, depth, and source(s) of 
the problem. When organizations are in the pre-crisis phase or crisis 
phase and organizational triage (am) methods must be employed, time is 
often the enemy of the organization and ultimately to the 
diagnostician. 
Shortening the diagnostic time through such "scanning" techniques 
that the syndrome as a "working hypothesis" provides more time and 
a better use of available financial resources so the time and resources 
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left can be used on developing a program of treatment and implement irg 
the treatment program identified. In addition, the less time this 
intervention process takes, the less organizational deterioration the 
change sponsor and the change agent most address, and the less trauma 
occurs to the target of the charge. 
CHAPTER 4 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE: A CRISIS INTERVENTION MXEL 
As a continuation of the development of the theory of 
organizational degeneration and crisis formation, an operational 
intervention model was developed by this student. 
Stated in organizational developmental terms (from this student's 
perspective), the goals of intervention during the crisis period should 
be to: 
1) . Reduce the experienced sense of hopelessness, enabling the 
organizational participants to retain a feeling of competence 
and self-worth and reducing the feeling of inmediate 
pressure. 
2) . Diagnose the maladaptive organizational manifestations and 
their severity. 
3) . Identify the dominant organizational elements that are out of 
alignment. 
4) . Open up channels of communication, create an aura of trust or 
movement towards trust. 
5) . Determine what adaptive (coping) mechanisms have been 
attempted and why they have failed. 
6) . Unfreeze behavior, decision-making, and managerial responses. 
The model, labeled the "organizational triage model," enhances and 
refines the crisis theory into an intervention model. Caplan developed 
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symbols for portraying the crisis process.1 By his theory, when a 
crisis terminates, the new adaption occurring at the end of the crisis 
(new equilibrium) will result in a higher or lower level of adaption 
than before the crisis. He used a modified square root syntool (V—) 
to relate the crisis process. The horizontal line to the left of the 
symbol represents the equilibrium that existed before the crisis. The 
sharp downward line represents the loss of functioning which happens 
when the crisis is at its peak. The length of the peak is the 
intensity of the crisis. The upward stroke indicates the new level of 
equilibrium that has been attained. The horizontal line to the right 
is the new equilibrium that may be higher or lower than before the 
crisis. The conventional square root sign (-v/—) is the synbol of the 
desired post-crisis outcome. 
Adapting the symbol used by Caplan, Figure 11, found on page 118, 
is a diagram of the model entitled "Organizational Triage Model: 
Stages and Fhases." The model depicts a sequencing of stages: pre¬ 
crisis equilibrium; onset of degeneration profile; pre-crisis period; 
crisis period; and new equilibrium. Each of these stages is further 
subdivided into phases for ease of understanding. 
The organizational triage model begins with pre-crisis 
equilibrium. This would be the normal operating state for the 
industry. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a normal level of 
interaction between elements. This would be shewn by a sine wave that 
1g. Caplan, An Approach to Commnitv Mental Health (New York: 
Grune and Station, 1961). 
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will stay consistently between the organizationally established 
operational norms and the legal and real resource constraints for the 
organization. This is a diagram of the normal operating, steady state 
of a healthy organization. 
The second stage is the onset of the degeneration profile. This 
degeneration occurs with misalignment of two or more dominant elements 
In this second stage of the model, the formation of misalignment 
between two or more of the dominant elements can be caused by: the 
trigger of a catastrophic event; the result of the erosion of an 
organization's elasticity or the organizations's ability to resist 
environmental (internal or external) pressures through adaptation or 
absorption;2 inattention to proper organizational monitoring and 
maintenance that keeps the organization within tolerable operating 
parameters (often seen as managerial denial); and over-adjustment, too 
little adjustment, or making adjustments too often (such as constantly 
changing operations or monitoring reporting forms). As seen in figure 
11, found on page 118, the misalignment will occur, shewn as a downward 
trend line. The misalignment is then addressed and a new state or 
organizational condition forms shown as the upward trend line. In this 
degeneration model, the upward trend line does not go all the way back 
2Organizational absorption is a phenomenal most often observed by 
this student when organizational change is introduced. The 
organization absorbs the external change intervention effort into the 
organization with no rejection, hut also with no change being 
generated. Typically this is due to: selection of an intervention 
protocol that is of too low order of magnitude; the intensity of 
treatment is too little or takes too long to administer; or treatment 
is used too often. 
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to the previews state or condition. Therefore, each next intervention 
effort to address the misalignment starts at a lower point or point of 
greater disadvantage. A generation or developing organizational 
profile would have the upward trend line always ending above the point 
prior to the dip. As can be seen, after the second iteration, the 
starting point for the third intervention is even below the lowest 
point of the first intervention effort. 
The degeneration rate is linear at this second stage. Equilibrium 
is definitely impacted at this stage and manifested by the end of this 
stage by the increased and consistent inability of the organization's 
management to reduce equivocality.3 
The pre-crisis period or stage of degeneration in the model has 
three rather distinct phases. Phase I is manifested as the rise of 
inner tension, due to the formation of mistrust, conflict, and 
ccmrunication breakdown. Althcu^i this phase can be easily measured, 
general interviews with the organizational members will quickly 
indicate such problem manifestations. Such comments as "we have a 
ccmnunication problem" and "the morale is low here" are typical of such 
a phase. These are not the problems, tut are the result of the 
misalignment problem. Although the staff often will attest that 
performance is "suffering greatly," actual performance audits will not 
show a measurable reduction. 
3Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2d ed. 
(Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 
189. 
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Cfcring this phase the organizational markers try to get the 
attention of management to recognize the misalignment and correct it. 
In the degenerative situation, such as diagranmed by the model on 
figure 11, found on page 118, management, uncomfortable with the 
synptcms of this degeneration, reacts in numerous ways. Typical 
maintenance managers look for a source of blame, most often quite 
removed from the actual source, even external to the organization. The 
"former administration," the "national union," the 'Toad economy," 
"corporate policy," and the "microwave generation" are such exanples. 
As shewn on figure 9, found on page 87, valuable time that could be 
used to correct the misalignment is lost while the search for blame 
continues. Meanwhile, the misalignment increases which will require 
even greater managerial efforts to correct. Attempts are sometimes 
made to correct the problems, as perceived, by increasing the use of 
maintenance managerial reaction-type techniques which are most often 
ineffective, such as reassigning problem task groups or individuals. 
During this time period, the misalignment of the dominant elements 
starts to create organizational blockages. Although these blockages 
can be in many forms, cxximjnication blockage is a classic example. 
Where before verbal instructions and feedback were given, new written 
documentation is required, often provided in a number of copies 
requiring several signatures. Form new takes precedence over function. 
The attempts to resolve the areas of frustration only act to 
increase the frustration in a degenerative organizational profile. The 
intervention used is often too late, too little, and applied at the 
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syirpton. The result is entry into Fhase II and the movement towards 
the state of disharmonic resonance. 
Fhase II is the formulation of negative coping mechanisns and is 
exuded by at least a measurable number of the organization's link-pins. 
The organization becomes "sick" in that its link-pins become weakened 
due to the coping mechanisms employed, and the bonding action between 
link-pins become weakened and less predictable. The organization is 
now more susceptible to degeneration at an ever increasing rate. 
A link-pin, as used here, is an individual in an organization that 
forms a point on which others in the organization can line up on and 
often connect, either informally and formally. Link-pins, as 
individuals, act as intra- and inter-connectors between the members of 
an organization. An example of an individual acting as an intra- 
connector is when one links two or more other individuals to form a 
power pocket or influence group. When the same individual acts to join 
multiple power subgroups, he/she becomes an inter-ccnnector link pin. 
Typically, inter-cxxinectors operate to link the different organiza¬ 
tional levels of hierarchy and to link unlike task groups, often 
geographically separate. 
The link-pin role is extremely important in this crisis theory in 
that it is the ability, method, and completeness of the members of the 
organization to align with the link-pins that provide a major source of 
organizational alignment, ultimate equilibrium, and health. 
The negative coping mechanisms are manifested as disbelief or 
denial by maintenance managers, recrimination (or desire to punish or 
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get back at those that are causing this extreme discomfort), anger, 
fear, and bizarre organizational behaviors, to name a few. The bizarre 
organization behaviors are what gives the organization its label of 
being in crisis and becomes the source of news stories. A classic 
exanple, observed by this student, was the policy sent to all corporate 
regional offices that, in order to cut costs and stop further profit 
erosion, all travel was to cease. Being a service cortpany that 
required traveling to the customer to service existing contracts, the 
policy was critically flawed and acted only to send a new shock of 
uncertainty throughout the organization. Another often seen, bizarre 
organizational behavior is the passing of a baseless and damaging rumor 
throughout the organization. Organizations in the second phase often 
rely on rumor to circumvent blocked formal ocnmunicaticn channels, and 
therefore are susceptible to becoming victimized by such rumors. 
As shewn on figure 11, found on page 118, the degenerative lines 
are much longer during the pre-crisis period compared to the onset of 
the degeneration profile. These deeper downward thrusts with shallow 
upward thrusts reflect the increasing deterioration of the 
organization. In other words, the organization is spending more of its 
time in a state of decline than in corrective action. 
The third phase is characterized as the movement towards 
disorganization of function. Non-performance is often measurable if 
organization coping syndromes have not formed. Often one or more 
syndromes are formed and actively try to impede the further decline of 
the organization. A management or leadership vacuum often exists which 
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acts to further escalate the degenerative process. Personnel that are 
easily employable outside the organization due to their expertise, arri 
whose benefits, such as pension, do not preclude leaving the 
organization, will leave during this time period. Often interviews 
reflect the majority of employees would leave if they could obtain the 
same pay and benefits elsewhere. During phase III, the image of the 
organization as being in trouble becomes general knowledge in the 
marketplace and it becomes hard to attract qualified replacement 
personnel. It is even more of a problem with attrition of key 
personnel during a period when their informal leadership is the ally 
effective leadership still holding the organization together. 
At this phase, the organization is starting to absorb more of the 
input resources for its own survival than for producing a product or 
service. Often the organization takes on a short-term reactive stance 
with survival now being the primary driving mission. The organization 
« more control conscious, information is given cut based on a 
strict need-to-know policy, and mistrust becomes rampant. Curing this 
phase "power pockets" form to challenge management cpenly. Often the 
organization members search for a "white knight" to save them. 
Typically one or more maverick employee(s), often of lew level 
supervision status that are frustrated with their rate of promotion, 
announce their candidacy by challenging management in front of others, 
such as at a staff meeting or at a special meeting called to address 
the unrest. Most often the attempt to gain leadership in this manner 
is unrealized in that the bonding of the organization is no longer 
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predictable and the grass roots support needed from the esiployee 
mentoership cannot be formed. The result is the candidate recognizes 
his/her sudden lack of support and the unrealistic risk he/she is 
taking and the leadership attempt fails. This candidate often is 
damaged for the rest of his/her career. 
Recognizing that such exposure is not worth the benefits, the 
power pockets turn to guerrilla tactics which can include vandalism, 
sabotage, and other extreme organizational performance perturbations. 
Often the role of "negative organizational escalator" forms which acts 
as the "bullet maker" or tactician who plots actively against the 
organization, but uses others to "fire the bullets." At this point, 
the organization is all too often in such a disarray that it cannot 
adequately counter the assault from within and the organization reaches 
a new intolerable level of disorganization or disequilibrium. 
Disharmcnic resonance is now established, the organization utility 
index is now zero or below, and degeneration occurs at a geometric 
rate. The organization is in crisis or the crisis stage. 
The crisis period or Phase IV of the model, as shewn in figure 11, 
found on page 118, is characterized by such phenomena as: panic; 
managerial paralysis; support system ossification; collapse; non- 
functioning; total focus on survival; shock; uncertainty; 
organizational chaos; radical treatment for survival; and radical 
change tactics. The degeneration of the organization is such that 
seldom, if ever, can there be a turnaround without external 
intervention. Without intervention a for-profit organization is 
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terminal. If the organization is artificially kept alive, due to its 
being a vital public service or given support by private or public 
funding infusions, the organization will deteriorate to a survival 
mode. Often the organization becomes corrupt to the point the illegal 
activity is institutionalized, the operating systems atrophy, arri/or 
bonding of elements becomes only self-serving to the point of 
militancy. 
The Fhase IV part of the model introduces the organizational 
triage (OIR) intervention process needed to reverse this crisis 
profile. At this point in the organization's decline, the level of 
managerial skill needed to obtain a turnaround, as experienced by this 
student, will need to be nothing less than organizational heroics. The 
management focus should be on changing behavior and not on "attitude 
change." Applying imperfect solutions to major areas of misalignment 
is preferable to fine tuning excellent solutions that only address a 
small segment of the problem. The organization, at this point, is most 
often working on its financial reserves, if any are left. The key to 
turnaround at this point is speed which is caused by time pressure due 
to rapidly depleting resources. This factor alone takes most of an 
organization's management cut of action in that their previous 
inability to handle the degeneration was largely due to hesitation and 
not taking decisive action. The level of decline at this point further 
aggravates the problem in that managers tend to "freeze up" due to the 
trauma of the situation. In other words, the stress of the situation 
has passed beyond the point of being motivating to new being 
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deactivating. Hie student has observed many organizations at this 
state and the actions of managers become "the load has been lifted from 
my shoulders" or where they have made peace with theieelves that it is 
exit of their control. They new expend their efforts on personal 
agendas. Where before they would be staying up all night to coordinate 
getting an inportant proposal cut, they take the day off and go golfing 
and often do not return in time even to sign the proposed transmittal 
letter. Often lower level managers abruptly leave the organization, 
almost as if they want to punish the organization for not allowing them 
to play a more important part in the declining organization. As a 
result, the connecting points, these managers, needed to link the 
turnaround management team to the formal in-crisis organization are 
damaged and a transition from in-crisis management leadership to 
turnaround management leadership is, at best, difficult. 
Therefore, the need for speed in treatment dictates the treatment 
intervention process. Bibeault cedis this state the "emergency 
stage."4 He goes on to write that in this problem stage the 
organization "doesn't have time for big studies . . .,"5 tut he warns 
"don't jump into the fire fight without a plan" as in the fray "one 
will lose the perspective." He recognized that it is normal to be 
tempted to jump in without such a plan.6 
4Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn 
losers into Winners (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Ccnpany, 1982), p. 99. 
5Ibid., p. 96. 
6Ibid., p. 97. 
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CflR Intervention 
In this student's model, the first organizational triage (on*) 
intervention stage is the assessment process. However, in reality, 
this is a multiple step process. First, as shown in figure 13, found 
on page 137, the leadership for the turnaround process has to be 
identified. This typically is an individual that the organization can 
support with their sponsorship. This individual needs to be a crisis 
manager. The optimum profile would be someone that: 
enjoys stress and conflict; 
has a high "RFM" or the ability to coordinate many tasks 
simultaneously and can "change channels" easily; 
does not become confused or deviated from the task by 
emotion, implied pressure, or personal agendas; 
recognizes that change in behavior is the only variable 
he/she can control as a crisis manager and that "attitude 
change" is of no value at this point; 
- recognizes that an imperfect solution that addresses eighty 
percent of the problem is better than an excellent solution 
that addresses twenty percent of the problem, but that takes 
three times longer to achieve;7 
has high mental agility; 
is assertive and exudes an "in control" presence; 
- is strong in verbal communication skills; 
is tough-minded and seemingly tireless; 
7Ibid. 
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has a positive mental attitude; 
has the ability to draw clear lines of what is appropriate 
behavior and can consistently apply the treatment, regardless 
of the recipient of the treatment; 
has a strong ability to "sell" his/her point of view by being 
able to relate to the change and move the target to his/her 
point of view; 
has a well-develcped base in organizational behavior and am 
technology; 
has experience in conducting or participating directly in 
other turnaround efforts; 
has the ability to create an informal power base; 
has the ability to quickly regain "idiosyncrasy credit"8 lost 
by judgement error. 
This individual typically has a "cluster" management style and operates 
at a Stage I (highly directive) or II (family) level of organization 
development and leadership. In other words, he/she becomes the "star" 
in the turnaround performance. Most often these individuals ccme from 
outside of the troubled organization. In fact, this student has never 
seen it done otherwise and work successfully. 
The "star" selection process needs to be precise to ensure that 
all the necessary traits are present. This student developed an 
assessment process specifically for this part of the COR process called 
8Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 103. 
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"Assessment Plus." This selection process has been proven highly 
predictable and successful. Simply, the process measures the 
organization in its level of development and decline and identifies the 
specific minimum skill level that is needed to addh>rs the 
organization. The candidates are then measured using a series of 
assessment instruments, all purchased from outside vendors. Typically, 
sixty to eighty dimensions are measured and are developed into a 
profile which is then compared to the "desired" profile. The closer 
the fit the greater the probability of the candidate's success. 
The person selected for this "star" position must realize that 
this is a temporary heroic role that must not be continued after the 
organization has reached a new state of equilibrium. Often crisis 
managers are so excellent at what they do that they cannot adjust back 
to a more maintenance managerial style. Therefore, these cluster star 
managers must be replaced at the end of the turnaround process; 
otherwise, they create crises to resolve and the organization never 
reaches a true level of equilibrium. 
In some cases, the "star" selection process needs to cone later in 
the OIR process if the organization is not ready to sponsor the OTR 
intervention. In these situations an external intervention consultant 
team is utilized in a leadership role. This student has found that the 
private sector tends to be much more ready to accept OTR treatment 
since their own resources are being depleted. In the public sector the 
organization's sponsor of the OIK intervention must be readied. This 
is more difficult for the urgency of intervention is not as often felt 
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because the resources available are not directly related to 
performance, in a publicly funded organization. The depletion of 
financial reserves motivates in the private sector while this is 
secondary in the public sector. Image is the primary motivator in the 
public sector, which cones from the individuals providing the service. 
However, organizational maintenance and development becomes as 
important in the public sector, as in the private sector. 
The next step in the OTR intervention process is to form a triage 
team. The leader selects his/her team based upon expertise, 
availability, and ability to form a synergistic tram through quick 
bonding. This student's experience suggests a team of at least two 
members. The number of members is based on two factors: the size, 
level of degeneration, and complexity of the organization; and the 
complexity of the organization and the amount of external force or 
influence that needs to be added to stabilize the organization. The 
team must be balanced in expertise and leadership style which is not to 
suggest the team members need to have the same expertise and 
personalities. 
There are three roles to be filled. Om role is the leader role. 
The second role is the expert role which provides the understanding of 
how the problem degeneration evolved and defines the dominant 
organizational elements and their dynamics or interactions with each 
other. The third role provides creative solution development, 
unencumbered with the desire to save face, one's position, or the 
responsibility for carrying a tradition. The first and second roles 
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can join together to play the third role, if necessary, if the second 
role or expert role is provided from within the organization, it cannot 
be part of the current power base that needs to be shifted or could be 
subject to job termination by the process. Since intervention at this 
crisis stage very often requires surgery,9 this criterion for selection 
is most important. It is recommended not to use internal 
organizational team members, from this student's experience and others 
(Bibeault).10 
Hie triage team's first task is to quickly assess the state of the 
organization. A key requirement for a successful organizational triage 
(OIR) intervention is the ability to discern between dominant and 
recessive elements in that valuable time can be lost in aligning 
recessive elements that will have no significant impact in stabilizing 
the organization. It has been observed, on occasion, that consultants 
c^n to have a "treatment" of which they are fond or with which they 
feel comfortable and they often proceed to recommend this treatment for 
every problematic case. The result often provides a classic example of 
dealing with a recessive element that has no real value in addressing 
the larger problems of the organization. 
Bibeault points cut at this critical stage ocnputers are useless 
and a sharp pencil and a good mind are most needed. ^ This assessment 
9Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn losers Into 
Winners, p. 99. 
10Ibid., p. 97. 
^Ibid., p. 99. 
133 
process is where the term "triage" best applies.12 The assessment 
process has two primary objectives. The first is to allow the triage 
team to understand the situation sufficiently and the second is to 
develop a plan of action.13 
The process scans the misaligrraent of dominant elements that are 
most exposed and prioritizes what needs to be first, that 
which will have the greatest turnaround inpact. The assessment process 
should normally take only a few days, at most, in the private sector 
and a few weeks, at most, in the public sector. However, this part of 
the triage process is most necessary for success. Since there is 
always a honeymoon period with the entry of the team, this time can be 
used for the assessment process.14 
Typically in a declining organizational state, marketing, parts of 
production/service, and top management are the most exposed sectors.15 
Therefore, this is where the assessment begins. This student has found 
that management is clearly first in importance to the reversed process; 
where the surgery often needs to occur; and the area that played the 
major part in creating the crisis state. The "bleeding" of the 
organization is often through production or the service provided, which 
makes it next in importance. Part of the triage approach is to step 
12 Ibid. 
13Ibid., p. 96. 
14Ibid., p. 97. 
15Handy, TTrYterstandina Organizations, p. 199. 
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the "bleeding" of resources that is ever-increasing the shortness of 
time to turn around the organization.16 
As has often been said by Bibeault and others,17 "cash is king" 
during a turnaround in the private sector. Cash is not unlike blood to 
a human undergoing surgery or treatment. The life blood for triage in 
the public sector is information, with cash being second, from this 
student's experience. Information leakage or uncontrolled "bleeding" 
of information paralyzes the elected official which in turn will not 
allow the triage process to continue as the change sponsorship is 
removed. 
Marketing is important to both the public and private sectors. 
Too often the lack of marketing in the public sector is me of the 
major sources of misalignment. "Perception of service" most often 
precedes the actual service request, which is the controlling factor in 
obtaining the necessary resources to operate the organization. 
Additional purposes of the assessment process are to: obtain change 
sponsorship; gain credibility so the team is given the freedom of 
implementation; identify the turnaround leverage point(s); verify and 
reaffirm the sponsor's perception that the organization is in crisis or 
clearly establish a true level of dissatisfaction with the current 
state of operations and organization in the sponsor; and identify the 
16Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—How Managers Turn losers into 
Winners, p. 98. 
17Ibid., p. 99. 
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c°re business or service that is the "mother lode"18 that must be 
protected throughout the triage process. 
The format of the triage assessment is often not extremely formal 
in terms of text, but is very specific in the identification of 
dominant elements cut of alignment and the benchmarking of the extent 
of this misalignment. Armed with this assessment, the next process is 
the treatment protocol selection. 
Selection of Treatment, Protocol 
As can be seen in figure 12 found on page 136, the organizational 
triage treatment protocols overlap, tut are significantly different 
from the organization development protocol. An overview of the 
selection logic used to identify the proper level of treatment for any 
phase of the organizational degeneration is outlined in diagram form in 
figure 13 found on page 137 entitled: "Protocol Selection Process for 
Degeneration Intervention." 
18Ibid., p. 103. 
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Level 1: Salvage Protocol 
Level 2: Treatment Protocol 
Level 3: Surgery Protocol 
Organizational 
Development 
Process 
Organizational 
► Triage 
Process 
Level 4: Organizational Termination 
FIGURE 12 
LEVELS OF raeocia RATION INTERVENTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND TRIAGE PROCESSES: 
A COMPARISON 
For a Phase IV crisis state, only two intervention protocols are 
available. These are, first, the treatment protocol and second, 
surgery protocol which can be used on an individual or task group. The 
key is to select whatever protocol will ensure survival by allowing the 
organization to stabilize itself temporarily so realignment of the most 
critical dominant elements becomes possible and a state of turnaround 
occurs and healing begins. 
To reduce the diagnostic and decision-making time, this student 
developed an algorithm of over eight hundred decision points and action 
blocks entitled "Organization Degeneration Intervention Algorithm" 
(ODIA). Under the guidance of this algorithm the point of intervention 
can be determined and the level of intervention can be selected, being 
either the salvage, treatment, or surgery protocols or a decision can 
be to allow termination. 
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The salvage protocol is the least severe. This protocol is best 
applied in the earliest stages of misalignment and pre-crisis. It is 
basically manipulation of misalignments through the clear 
identification of the elements affected. By focusing attention on 
these misaligned dominant elements, they tend to adjust themselves. 
Strengthening of the desired, formal bending relationships that are 
aligned with informal relationships has been found helpful to minimize 
further degeneration. This student has been able to do this through 
the assistance of a type of organizational power "X-ray1' that measures: 
vector/valence (ability to informally influence and the intensity of 
that influence); cohesive index; "RFM" level; leadership effectiveness 
index (flexibility); and stress score. With this power charting 
approach, this student has been able to increase the power of the 
organizational diagnostics and the consultant's confidence in where to 
adjust the formal and informal link-pins and how to strengthen the 
linkage alignments once adjustments have been made. The salvage 
protocol also places special emphasis on establishing new goals and 
evaluation criteria to reduce the uncertainty and increase system 
integration.19 
The treatment protocol focuses, as one of its approaches, on the 
identification of specific managerial skill, personality, knowledge, 
and ability deficiencies that cause misalignment. The treatment can be 
through the development or extinguishing of dominant managerial skill 
19John R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The 
Organizational t.i fe cycle (San Francisco; Jossey-Bass Inc., 
Publishers, 1981), p. 369. 
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elements to increase one's ability to effect proper aligrment between 
elements one has to manage. Standard organizational development 
methods are often employed such as strategic planning, team building, 
trust enhancement, and quality circles, to mention a few. often the 
focus is to remove organizational "blind spots" so realignment can be 
facilitated. 
Typically, solutions to organization misalignment are only sought 
near the problem area. This seems to increase as the organization 
degenerates and stress increases. Therefore, the solution is often not 
the optimal solution because the full range of alternatives were not 
able to be considered. The treatment protocol addresses this issue 
very effectively, especially in Ihase II and Phase III of the pre¬ 
crisis period. At Phase IV the treatment protocol is often used in 
concert with the surgery protocol. 
The surgery protocol speaks for itself. Once the intervention 
protocol selection and strategy has been made and the leverage point 
identified, the triage team is ready for inplementation. It should be 
noted that turnaround leverage is much greater when applied by an 
outside triage team than an internal manager, and therefore the 
irrplementaticn should not be handed off to an internal team at this 
point in time. 
The first part of the inplementation of the intervention is to 
stabilize the organization. This has been called by many names 
temporary steady state, homeostasis, freezing, and quasi-stationary 
equilibrium, to name a few. This is the stage where the degeneration 
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process ceases to continue and further decline is suspended. This is 
necessary to relax the organizational element linkages that are being 
stretched and pulled cut of alignment so they can be affected by the 
introduction of the triage turnaround leverage point. This stage is 
diagrammed as shewn on figure 11, found on page 118, as a flat tip. 
Theoretically speaking, the sum of the vectors or influence of all 
dominant elements should equal zero, as discussed an page 69. This 
does not suggest any lack of dynamism, but rather provides an 
opportunity for the turnaround leverage point when pushed to be able to 
have enough directional force or vector to be a catalyst to initiate 
the realignment process. This student is continuously surprised at the 
very little vector that is needed to be introduced to start the 
turnaround when a true temporary, steady state has been established. 
The true measure of an experienced triage team is how little turnaround 
leverage pressure is required. 
Once the primary dominant elements are realigned, the triage 
application ends. At this stage a long-term regeneration development 
plan is developed with the new management team that has been 
identified. The temporary leader either is reassigned, required to 
change management style, or is removed. If the individual is not 
removed, a new set of organizational stressors will typically develop 
that can create a new misalignment. The only alternative is to adjust 
the culture to assimilate this individual's style, tut such is only 
practical when the organization is small, not complex in terms of task 
performed, or the individual has ownership of the organization. 
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At this juncture, the OUR team must leave the organization 
physically. If they continue to operate, the organization will reject 
the team and the organization coping mechanism manifested as the 
formation of an Intervention Rejection Syndrome (IRS). with this 
syndrome the whole treatment intervention previously introduced comes 
into challenge and the organization degenerates to a new low with 
termination of the organization often the result. 
The triage treatment intervention is reviewed and continually 
monitored thrcu^i the formal feedback from the management team. The 
changes that do not occur are restructured and submitted to the now 
legitimate management team. The triage intervention is now completed 
and the organization leaves Fhase IV. The crisis period is over. The 
goals after this crisis period are: 
1) . Enable all involved to fully regain their self-worth along 
with acceptance of the new state-of-affairs. 
2) . Enable the organizational parts involved to continue 
realistic and adaptive action. This would include 
maintenance of available relationships and development of 
new, adaptively useful ones,20 
3) . Develop long-range adaptive growth from the experience. 
4) . "Tune-up" managerial and operational processes to establish a 
level of operations that will improve the characteristics of 
2°m. J. Horowtiz and Nancy B. Kaltrieder, "Brief Treatment of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders," New Directions for Mental Health 
Services, ed. Gerald F. Jacobsen (San Francisco, California: Jossey- 
ftagg inc. f Publishers, 1980), p. 69. Adaptation of Horowtiz concept. 
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the new equilibrium that is more adaptive, monitoring, and 
sensitive to problem influences and external stimuli. 
5). Create a new proper alignment of dominant organizational 
elements to achieve maximal organizational utility. 
Using standard organizational development technology the 
organization continues to heal. Externally the organization's new 
wellness needs to be marketed so a new accurate image can be fostered 
that will correct any remaining negative perceptions the degenerative 
period left on its clients, customers, and peer groups. The 
organization is then, in essence, reconnected to its suppliers, 
financial institutions, customers, and potential employee pool. Often 
degeneration causes the applicant pool of excellent candidates to dry 
up and the reconnecting process is especially necessary with search 
firms, training schools, and educational institutions that produce such 
candidate pools. 
Finally, a new equilibrium is established and, as shown in figure 
11, found cxi page 118, it is at a higher level of organizational 
utility than before the degeneration. The organization is once again 
healthy and can become synergistic. Organizational degeneration is 
rather straightforward in theory, but complex in application, as shown 
in the triage model. 
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Intervention Strategies and Qhservaticra 
Based on Field Experience 
Rcwe and Mason write: 
"Recognizing that alignment is important, what can be done to 
correct a situation in which there is misalignment7 The 
following are a number of potential interventional approaches 
that can be used to improve alignment: (1) a charge in 
organization structure and/or realignment of authority of 
responsibility; (2) effective selection of individuals on the 
basis of both qualifications and style; (3) improved 
counseling and/or training regarding career selection and 
career paths; and (4) consideration of style as a means to 
evaluate relationships between the individual and peers 
and/or superiors.”21 
The triage intervention purpose is twofold. One, to create a 
temporary steady state or equilibrium for the traumatized organization. 
This intervention is necessary in order to establish an organizational 
climate conducive to accepting the change. Two, to select and 
the dominant elements most cut of alignment that will have the greatest 
impact on reversing the organizational decline in the shortest time. 
The shorter the time, the greater the change momentum, the more 
predictable that the change will be internalized, the less damage is 
sustained, and the shorter and more complete the healing. 
This student has found that removal of the primary obstruction has 
the greatest effect on creating an organizational environment receptive 
to other change. To do this the organization triage sponsor, i.e., the 
board of directors, elected officials, etc., must learn to put trust in 
the triage tpam or external consultant that the removal process will 
21Alan J. Rowe and Richard 0. Mason, Managing with Style:—A Guide 
to Understanding. Assessing, and Improving Decision Making (San 
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1987), p. 63. 
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not further the degeneration by being too little, too late, ihe 
removal of a key manager (surgery) ia most often a "process" aid not a 
simple act of removal if law suits and a "palace guard" backlash are to 
be avoided. 
Having orchestrated the removal of many CEO's and senior managers, 
this student kncws that the desire to leave has to acme from within the 
person to be removed. The triage removal strategy is to give the 
targeted individual the requirement (through a "contracting" process) 
to achieve a series of task objectives that represent the weak areas 
that are significantly contributing to the decline of the organization. 
A very firm time frame is set, specific quantifiable measures are 
identified, and a team is selected to monitor the progress, formally 
report the results, and provide feedback to the targeted individual. 
The failure to achieve the objectives is (kxumented. Since the 
targeted individual "contracted" for his/her own time frame for 
achieving results, the completion time cannot be a source of excuse. 
The individual recognizes the failure to achieve, even if he/she will 
deny the reason, which is often self-generated. This pressure (stress) 
increases until the threshold of job dissatisfaction is met and since 
organization cxananitment is removed, as part of the triage strategy, the 
condition has been met for a resignation. To be successful, the 
objectives have to be real, fairly monitored, and honest feedback roust 
be provided. If the person meets the objectives, he or she stays and 
the blockage behavior has been removed as the result. 
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The removal sends a clear message throughout the organization that 
the decline is being proactively addressed. As an indicator that a 
temporary steady state is occurring, the panic leaving of the 
organization typically decreases significantly as the turnaround plan 
is endorsed by the triage intervention sponsor and internalized by the 
organizational members. The organizational climate is now "cooled" and 
the organization is ready to receive the process to realign the nest 
dominant elements impacting the decline. 
The element realignment part of triage starts with the 
identification of "bleeders" that are being allowed to draw off needed 
resources. Such bleeders" can range from having to with a team 
or individual that takes a disproportionate amount of management's 
time, to poor quality control that results in customer returns, to 
product lines that are no longer profitable. Again, surgery is the 
prescribed intervention protocol. 
The misalignment of the key dominant elements that are negatively 
inpacting the organization and fueling the crisis requires a very 
tailored approach. Most dominant elements have a "spark plug" or 
"trigger" that sets off another cycle of degeneration. The triage team 
must identify this trigger point if possible. A trigger point can be 
as subtle as using a single word that acts to "replay" an error made by 
<ytnp task group, thus maintaining a disconnect between two key task 
groups, which sets off a whole new series of defending activities. 
Other triggers can be symbolic behaviors only significant to that 
organization. For example, yelling at a supervisor in front of his/her 
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subordinates which telegraphs the message that the supervisor's role is 
not held in any higher regard than the lowest employee and that the 
whole work force is comprised of "little people" who require no respect 
or dignity from management. Any efforts to align the employee with the 
management team will fail as long as the trigger of yelling within 
earshot of the subordinates is continued—even as as a 
year. 
Once the dominant elements are misaligned and their triggers are 
identified, a detailed strategy needs to be developed to bring about 
alignment. Most often alignment is a multiple step process where 
pressure is applied initially at a point which is comfortable and on 
the surface easy to change. In other words, the pressure point does 
not directly act to threaten or increase the stress of the already 
stressed out group or individual. 
As an example, members of a board of directors were in serious 
conflict with each other and threatening to destroy an established, 
well known, and formally profitable organization. The misalignment was 
diagnosed as a bifurcation of the board. One group had a Stage I 
orientation to management policy formulation and the other had a Stage 
III orientation, as defined earlier on pages 64 and 65, which was 
created by acute cultural dissonance. 
The first step of the alignment process was to remove the board 
members to an off-site location where they could not damage on-going 
operations. The power or influence vectors and valences, as defined on 
page 69, were calculated for each board member and the level of 
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external influence needed to neutralize the group was determined. A 
triage team of three members was required to add the counter-balance 
necessary to get the board members' attention and maintain a steady 
state as behavior changes were introduced. The first work session 
required them to "contract" to do only one thing the triage team 
suggested and they as a group would agree to. After breaking up a 
fist fight which occurred in the first five minutes of the session, the 
board members power was neutralized in that no one subgroup was allowed 
to dominate the other subgroup. The resulting effort was for them to 
write a mission statement to which they could all agree. 
They were next instructed to have this framed in molded brass and 
hang it in their board room. They were next instructed that before the 
start of each future board meeting one member had to physically get up 
and go over to the plaque and read it aloud to the rest of the group. 
Although sirtple in process, the bifurcation that existed melted away 
over a period of less than a year and the board was brought back to 
meet on location. The perception by rank and file is that the conflict 
is over. Top management is once again fully able to key on or align 
philosophically and operationally with the Board. 
Although a sinple illustration, it shows that alignment is varied 
and oftentimes more subtle than the crisis situation would suggest. 
The designer of the intervention has to be careful that the 
intervention does not become "heroic" instead of realigning. 
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Sane general guidelines that have proven useful by this student in 
developing the proper solutions or intervention strategies are as 
follows. 
1). The greater the crisis the organization is experiencing, the 
more one should consider surgery. Surgery is used best to 
break counter-productive managerial bending and to stop 
organizational hesrorrhaging. It has a secondary effect of 
shocking the organization which can act to realign the 
dominant elements. It also telegraphs a clear message to 
those undecided employees that radical and significant 
change is going to occur and they should align themselves 
with the next leadership as the former leadership no longer 
has the power to create further misalignment or act as a 
buffer to the realignment process. If the surgery protocol 
is selected, all surgery should be done at the same time. 
Since an organization cannot be given anesthesia, all parts 
to be effected by the surgery protocol should be addressed 
in the same, quick time frame. Surgery that is spread out 
over several weeks often increases the healing time as the 
needed trust for healing is shattered. In other words, the 
surgery should be clear to all members of the organization— 
who or what is to be removed and a statement that those 
remaining have nothing to fear. To remove people at 
unstated intervals creates fear initially, then anger, and 
finally mistrust. The greater the mistrust the more 
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difficult the healing process is for those who remain. As 
Bibeault writes, surgery should be performed in "one 
step.»22 Along with the surgery there should be seme 
reaffirmation that the surgery is circumscribed and that 
those remaining are fully part of the turnaround team and 
long-term solution. If possible, a symbol of verification 
should be made as an observable gesture of this statement. 
This gesture should not be a gift as this signals to the 
recipient that the triage management team is feeling 
uncertain, guilty or needs support and approval and is 
willing to pay for it. A gift such as a team t-shirt or a 
cenpany irug is easily rejected without any loss to the 
employee and it makes an even greater statement in the form 
of a physical symbol of rejection. 
2). Select a solution that unloads those individuals or groups 
that do not quickly get into alignment. Regardless of their 
expertise value, the synergistic value of the new team 
effort will successfully ccnpete with a "star" performer and 
the expertise loss will soon be regained. This has been 
proven numerous times, from this student's experience, and 
is reinforced by Bibeault and others.23 Those individuals 
or task groups that are cut of sync with the realignment 
process are, by definiticxi, dominant elements. The 
22ibid., p. 99. 
23lbid., p. 97. 
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overriding objective of the triage intervention is to 
adcir^?&s those dominant elements most out of alignment which 
in this case would be these individuals or task groups. 
3) . Do not select a surgery protocol that will damage the 
business core if it is still viable in the market place. 
Multiple cores are possible in large organizations, but an 
organization in crisis cannot effectively respond when they 
have numerous service or product fronts to protect. The 
primary "mother lode," as suggested by Bibeault,24 should be 
identified and only the core sheltered during the Phase IV 
triage intervention phase. 
4) . Select a treatment protocol, if determined to be most 
beneficial, that is most in alignment with the values and 
culture of the sponsors. As Handy affirms, the management 
of crisis must override ccnmittees, rules, and procedures to 
be successful, and therefore will need to rely on political 
support of the sponsors.25 After the crisis period has 
ended, a maintenance management team will next need to be 
formed to develop the formalization of rules, procedures, 
regulations, and formal controls to maintain the newly 
created equilibrium. In the same context, the communication 
chain must be as short as possible between the triage team 
24Ibid., p. 96. 
25Handy, TTiyterstanflina Organizations, p. 200. 
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and the sponsor as often decisions will need to be mvia 
quickly, and formal, pre-existing channels are insufficient. 
5) . Based on experience and Bibeault's writings,26 the design 
and selection of a proper intervention strategy should not: 
- be too critical of solutions available, as timeliness is 
most important. 
- require a lot of justification to the sponsor. 
- try to address all misalignments or problems as only the 
primary ones are addressed under the triage concept. 
- identify problems without solutions already developed as 
this cxily acts to escalate the trauma of the crisis state 
and delays the turnaround. 
- share the plan with anyone without the real power in the 
turnaround situation or who does not have a stake in the 
implementation, as random sharing of information allows 
critique to surface from the still powerful but 
misaligned power pockets, which could confuse the 
sponsor. Typically a change agent wants to affirm 
his/her plan with the target and employ as much 
involvement as possible into the planning process, tut a 
crisis state differs significantly in this respect. 
6) . Select a plan of intervention that will immediately address 
the major points of misalignment and that will also 
26Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn losers into 
Winners, p. 97. 
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establish a leverage point for a turnaround. Oftentimes the 
best turnaround leverage point is singular and requires a 
ccnprcmise by the sponsor on an issue on which they desired 
to hold firm in the past. 
7) . Care should be taken that the synptan is not being addressed 
rather than the source of the misalignment. Syndromes, by 
their very nature, can mislead even the most skilled 
organizational diagnostician if a second and third 
verification is not used such as the use of organizational 
diagnostic instrumentation, hard data verification, and 
direct observation. 
8) . Incremental responses to Fhase IV organizational crisis is 
never adequate and provides a false start that acts only to 
magnify the radical changes that most be made later to 
correct the incremental response error. 
9) . Application of the wrong level of solution to the right 
problem is not effective. Selecting a "softer" 
organizational development intervention process, when an 
organizational triage process is required, will only use up 
the scarce time needed for a turnaround and act to escalate 
the decline. 
10). Surgical intervention that is premature, and thus by 
definition unnecessary or ineffectual in attaining the 
desired goal, is a burden to the recipient organization due 
to loss of a needed resource and decreased morale. It also 
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creates an increased risk to the organization due to the 
increased exposure to law suits. Therefore, there is an 
cptiman time for each type of intervention strategy. 
11). The misalignment of dominant elements must clearly be 
understood. There are two factors that must be measured and 
considered. The first factor is the intensity or grade 
level of the misalignment. The second factor is the 
dimension of the misalignment. There are three possible 
dimensional misalignments. The first misalignment is uni¬ 
dimensional where one element is involved. The second is 
niilti-dimensional, where two dominant elements are out of 
alignment and are logically related to each other and both 
are on the same task or structural level within the 
organization. The third, poly-dimensional misalignment, 
exists when two or more dominant elements are out of 
alignment representing two or more levels within the 
organization, such as managerial style and employee group 
misalignment. The higher the grade and the more dimensions, 
the more severe the misalignment. For example, a high 
grade, poly-dimensional misalignment of dominant elements 
most often exists in a Phase III or Phase IV state of 
crisis. 
12). The trigger point or catalyst that has initiated the 
misalignment should be determined. For example, if an 
organization's cohesiveness index is high, or over .5, and 
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the trigger points are not being reported (via interview or 
instrument) with any consistency or trend, and the stress 
•jvr-'i A national Role Stress Scale) 27 instrument results do 
not provide a pattern, external degeneration trigger stimuli 
are suggested. This student has also observed that when the 
cohesiveness is lew and disparity exists in trigger 
response, it is most likely that a destructive 
organizational state is well on the way to being developed 
for the task group and the organization will not be 
providing any significant organizational utility. 
27Udai Pareek, "Organizational Role Stress Scale," The 1983 Annual 
for Facilitators. Trainers, and Consultants, eds. Leonard D. Goodstein 
and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego: University Associates, Inc., 
1983), p. 115 - 123. 
CHAPTER 5 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE: OBSERVATIONS AND CCNCUJSICNS 
Although other organizational treatment theories and concepts 
exist, the COR descriptive and prescriptive theory, as developed in 
this dissertation, does not conflict with these existing theories. 
Instead, the OIR model could provide a useful framework in which 
current organizational theories and technologies can be assimilated and 
. m; 
worked into a comprehensive diagnostic and application model or 
algorithm. It is felt that such an approach, when refined, could form 
the basis of a new professional discipline. 
As envisioned, this professional discipline would take on the 
characteristics of organizational medicine. The professionals would 
became practicing organizational doctors. Currently no such equivalent 
exists. Organizational development practitioners, for the most part, 
are specialists in a given area of expertise and tend to prescribe the 
same treatment with which they are most familiar, regardless of the 
organizational malady. The treatment result is unpredictable and often 
with costly results to the organization and degrading of the consultant 
profession. 
The goals for the organizational triage (OIR) process were 
selprted to address these current weak areas that oculd act to increase 
client confidence and the ultimate value of organizational consultants. 
Specifically, the goals of the triage process are to: 
1). facilitate the prompt return to normal functioning of an 
organization? 
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2) . provide such correction at the least cost to the 
organization; 
3) . minimize the damage to the organizational menbers; and 
4) . provide an efficient medium through which organizations can 
avail themselves of technology to ensure an organization's 
survival. 
To provide the actualization of these goals, a comprehensive 
algorithm needs to be further developed that can act to guide the 
diagnoses and the structuring of treatment. The objective of such a 
comprehensive algorithm must not sinply confine the organizational 
intervention specialist to a mechanical directing of the client 
organization through the algorithm. 
If the consulting profession follows such a route, the 
professional succumbs to the myopia of the technician and the vision of 
a legitimate and respected profession will never be realized. A true 
organizational consultant must continually broaden his/her inquiry and 
scope of knowledge in order to develop and expand the field of OTR and 
increase the predictability of its application. The more OTR 
specialists learn about the interactions of organizational elements and 
how they become misaligned, the greater the value of the intervention 
process. 
Ultimately organizations will select and rely on their cwn 
"organizational physician," much as they new rely on their cwn 
attorneys. The organizational practitioners must work to legitimately 
extend their influence beyond quick fix interventions and became long- 
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terra advisors to organizational growth and development, ihe result 
will be more productive and healthier organizations as the are 
specialist operates at the opposite end of the oonflict spectrum from 
the legal profession. 
The objective of the OIR effort is to create maximum 
organizational harmony and synergy through the alignment of often 
conflicting or competing elements. 
It is the opinion of this student that an "organizational medical 
profession" would not only have the personal attraction and benefits of 
the medical profession, but have such without the negative of having 
one's patient ultimately dying. The organizational practitioner also 
has the value added of being able to positively influence numerous 
individuals simultaneously with each treatment. 
As a developing discipline, many see the financial and 
professional opportunities. The result is the development of a 
plethora of psychological and organizational diagnostic instruments, 
software systems, staff development programs, and consulting 
specialists. The practitioners dedicated to making this a profession 
must resist the urge to utilize every test available and apply the 
latest theory to inpress the client or to entice a potential client 
into participating in the latest "fad" treatment. 
A profession, however, needs to be built on solid theory and time 
tested with experience. Not unlike the medical profession, the 
newcomer to organizational development must recognize that the 
profession is still a practicing art and not a science. Craftsmanship 
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only cones with experience and exposure to a wide range of 
organizations. The organizational development profession should look 
at the medical profession as a general role model in terms of 
development and certification of qualified personnel. 
A system of internships would be of real value beyond basic 
education. All too often an individual joins a corporate firm out of 
graduate school as an internal consultant which does not provide 
hinv/her with an opportunity to see hew different organizations operate 
from various perspectives. 
Besides the potential for developing an actual discipline, the 
theory, as developed, has other potential applications. Any end user 
that has the need to assess or predict the probability of an 
organization to evolve into a crisis state or even termination would 
benefit from this theory application. 
More specifically, it would be of value to any investment 
institution whose loan is at potential risk. From an organizational 
perspective the current practice of investment institutions using 
financial statements as the sole predictor of organizational future 
health is tenuous, at best. The financial statement, as a report, is a 
snapshot in time, is descriptive of past performance, and documents the 
amount of assets available to infuse into the organization, if needed. 
The greater the assets, the longer an organization can be in a state of 
decline and the lower the risk of termination during a loan period. 
However, this financial report does not suggest organizational "health" 
or probability of organizational decline. The model, as presented, 
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iJTtroduoes an additional variable, organizational alignment, as a 
predictor of future organizational performance. 
Another potential application would be the creation of a new 
insurance product line similar to life insurance for individuals. 
Venture capitalists could have their exposure or their unsecured 
investment insured for a given term by talcing out insurance. The 
insurance company could use the model to rate the risk, not unlike fire 
insurance. As the misalignment and potential for degeneration 
increases, the rating will increase and the premium will be adjusted to 
cover the risk. This would be of the most value to newly forming 
business efforts that do not have a track record that the commercial 
banks can use, and allows private investment to become more attractive 
in that the base investment would be insured, even if they were an 
unsecured creditor. 
Another application could be a screening process for the employer 
or employee as to closeness of fit or alignment between a new job and 
the individual. With the cost of relocation of professional employees 
now often over fifty thousand dollars plus the risk to the two-income 
family, a cross-country move is no longer casual. All parties have an 
obligation to be sure that the fit will wear well over the long-term or 
at least long enough to offset the investment. This alignment theory 
provides such guarantee, as already experienced by this student. 
Last, the process can help an organization calculate its liability 
exposure and provide adequate defense in discrimination and civil 
rights violation cases. This student is increasingly being requested 
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to testify as an expert organizational witness in both state and 
federal courts. 
Although the theory, as developed, and model generated are rather 
extensive, the development process generated a series of questions. 
Seme of these questions suggest some areas for additional research and 
inquiry as follows. 
Research needs to be conducted on the ability of conventional 
theories of leadership, conflict resolution, decision-making, 
ccraiunication and time management, to explain behavior during the pre¬ 
crisis and crisis periods of organizational decline.1 We do not know 
clearly hew the styles of management are affected under crisis 
conditions. 
Miles2 stresses in his book that the public sector needs to 
develop a new cadre of leaders who will develop a process and will 
aggressively respond to declining resources. This would be a fertile 
area for research. 
Another area for research is to develop better organizational 
diagnostics to make sense of how events evolve and the interactions 
between elements. Seme theorists such as Bougon, Weick, and Binkjorst3 
initially looked at causal mapping as a creative methodology to trace 
events. This student has found this to be of interest and suggests 
ijehn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The 
Organizational t.i fe cycle (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass 
Inc., Publishers, 1981), p. 369. 
2Ibid., p. 361. 
3Ibid. 
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further research and afplicaticn of causal mappirq could be of real 
value. 
As presented in this dissertation, hew managers respond to initial 
signals of misalignment problems or crisis events often determines the 
level of managerial skill and effort that is needed to address the 
crisis event. However, a research topic of value would be why do seme 
managers deny and procrastinate while others react decisively? if this 
response variable could be better understood, one might be able to 
suocessfully address the misalignment forming even before it becomes 
too large for normal managerial skills to resolve. 
Ihere has been little consistent agreement or consensus in the 
literature regarding the inpact of organization degeneration and the 
acceptance of innovation. Some suggest one of the benefits of 
organizations in crisis is the receptivity to innovation (Lirdblcm, 
1968, and Glassberg, 1978),4 while others—Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; 
and Bozeman and Slasher 1978—and this student's experience suggest 
innovation is paralyzed along with a manager's fear of failure.5 
More research needs to be conducted on how the initial 
misalignment really is initiated or triggered. Miller (1955), in his 
"general theory for the behavior sciences" argued that all "living 
systems respond to continuously increasing stress first by a lag in 
response then by an over-compensatory response, and finally, by 
4Ibid., p. 370. 
5Ibid. 
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catastrophic collapse of the system. "6 These and other theories need 
to be further tested. 
In essence, the whole body of knowledge about organizations in 
decline and in crisis needs to be developed. The significant increase 
of interest in organizations in crisis in the period since this student 
started this dissertation is a most positive sign. As the interest 
grcws, the research will follow. 
In conclusion, the primary focus of this student's continued 
research will be in testing out and refining his triage i and 
assessment algorithm. 
Typical of rigorous research and academic inquiry, more questions 
are raised than are answered. However, this dissertation effort does 
offer the following conclusions. 
- Organizations can often be reversed in their decline given the 
proper intervention technology is applied. In other words, 
organizations do not have to parallel the human organism where 
death must ultimately occur within a rather fixed time frame. 
- Intervention with organizations that are in crisis requires a 
different treatment process than normally used for refining and 
developing healthy organizations. 
- Organizations degenerate due to their inability to create a new 
equilibrium resulting from an inadequate change effort due to 
one or more change inhibitors being in operation. 
6J. G. Miller, Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences 
(American Psychologist, 1955), p. 27. 
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To identify a successful intervention process to reverse a 
declining organization, the focus needs to be placed on 
realignment of "dominant elements" that cause or set-up a 
condition for decline. 
- Effective treatment of organizations in crisis most often 
requires external intervention. 
- An organization in crisis must first be stabilized before 
successful turnaround efforts can begin. 
- "Surgery1' of individuals, task areas, processes, or products is 
often a required intervention to reverse a declining 
organization. 
- Under crisis conditions time is critical and is often the enemy 
which requires the intervention strategy to be as efficient as 
possible which is the focus of organizational triage as an 
intervention model. 
Hopefully, this dissertation effort will provide the impetus for 
further research efforts that, taken collectively, can someday form the 
basis of a recognized and respected profession. It is to this end that 
this dissertation is dedicated. 
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